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The Punishment of Dixie Shanahan: Is There
Justice for Battered Women Who Kill?
Leigh Goodmark*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Dixie Schrieber and Scott Shanahan began dating in 1983. On May
10, 2004, Dixie Schrieber Shanahan was sentenced to fifty years of
imprisonment for the murder of Scott Shanahan. In between, there was a
marriage, children-and years of horrendous abuse. During the nineteen
years that Dixie and Scott Shanahan were together, Scott blackened
Dixie's eyes, bruised her, threatened her, dragged her by her hair,
pointed guns at her, tied her up and left her for days in the basement,
called her vile names, degraded her in front of friends, and generally
made her life a living hell. On August 30, 2002, believing that her life
and the life of her unborn child were in danger after days of beatings,
threats, and the promise, "This day is not over yet. I will kill you," Dixie
Shanahan shot her husband while he lay in bed. After less than one day
of deliberation, a jury found Dixie Shanahan guilty of second-degree
murder. Judge Charles L. Smith III sentenced Dixie Shanahan to fifty
years in prison.'
The community of Defiance, Iowa, divided sharply around the
prosecution of Dixie Shanahan. During the trial, both prosecution and
defense witnesses agreed that Scott Shanahan was an extremely violent
man who brutally abused his wife for years. But members of the
community debated whether Dixie Shanahan was justified in killing her
abuser. Some characterized Dixie Shanahan's actions as a final,
desperate attempt to save herself and her baby; others conceded the
severity of the abuse she endured over the years but maintained that she
had no right to take Scott Shanahan's life.2
Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. My thanks to Steven
Grossman, Jane Murphy, and Doug Nierle for their assistance in shaping this Article, and to Jennifer
Salyers, my incredible research assistant.
1. See infra Part II (discussing facts in Dixie Shanahan's case).
2. See Shanahan Punished by Husband and State, Letters to the Editor, DES MOINES REG.,
May 5, 2004, at 14A (including letters both for and against Dixie Shanahan); Mike Tidman, Letter to
the Editor, All Is Well with the Justice System, DES MOINES REG., June 8, 2004, at 8A ("Sounds like
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Accept, for the sake of argument, that Dixie Shanahan was guilty of
second-degree murder in the shooting death of her husband, Scott-that
the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that she shot her
husband and that that shooting was not justified.3 Was the punishment
that Dixie Shanahan received in this case just?
Fifty years of
imprisonment, with a requirement that she serve thirty-five years before
becoming eligible for parole. Nineteen years of abuse followed by,
essentially, a lifetime in jail. Members of the jury later asked the
governor to reduce the sentence; 4 one juror had assumed that Shanahan

would be sentenced to twenty-five years and serve, at most, eight years.'
Criminal punishment in America has been justified by philosophers
employing a number of theories. Chief among these are retribution,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 6 Each of these could
potentially serve as a rationale for punishing Dixie Shanahan. Closer
examination of her case, and the cases of other battered women who kill,
however, raises the question of whether these rationales make sense in
the context of these cases. Are the punishments meted out to these
women just?7 This Article approaches that question by discussing each
murder to me. And now she's going to pay a murderer's penalty. All's well with the justice
system."); Sherie Vermeer, Letter to the Editor, Have the Courage to Pardon Shanahan, DES
MOINES REG., June 8, 2004, at 8A ("If you have not been in her position, you cannot know the
feeling of helplessness that would drive you to protect yourself and your children by such desperate
means."); see also John Ferak, Verdict Leaves Kids in Limbo, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 1,
2004, at IB (quoting Defiance residents regarding the Shanahan verdict).
3. Shanahan never denied that she shot her husband but did argue that her actions were
justified. Transcript of Trial at 812-23, State v. Shanahan, No. FECR006475 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Shelby
County Apr. 30, 2004). The jury rejected that argument, apparently because Shanahan followed her
husband into the bedroom and shot him in the back while he was lying in bed, during a lull in the
abuse. From their verdict, it seems that jurors did not believe that-Shanahan was in imminent danger
and had no other option but to kill in self-defense. Dixie Shanahan's conviction for second-degree
murder was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Iowa in April 2006. State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d
121, 144 (Iowa 2006). For a discussion of the difficulties battered women who kill face in making
self-defense cases, see generally Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the
Criticsof Battered Women's Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155 (2004).
4. Staci Hupp, Chances of Being PardonedSlim for Shanahan, DES MOINES REG., May 29,
2004, at IA. In January 2007, Governor Tom Vilsack commuted Shanahan's sentence, decreasing
the mandatory minimum time that she must serve before becoming eligible for parole from thirtyfive years to ten. John Ferak, Sentence Commuted for Woman Who Kept Husband's Body in
Bedroom, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 6, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 254151.
5. Staci Hupp, 'It May Be Legal, But It Is Wrong', DES MOINES REG., May 11, 2004, at IA.
6. Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's
TorturedApproach to Cruel and UnusualPunishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 162-63 (1995-1996).
7. Abbe Smith has remarked on the speed with which advocates for battered women decry the
convictions of battered women who kill but show little interest in defending other victims accused of
crimes (such as Aileen Wuornos, who killed several men after years of abuse as a prostitute). Abbe
Smith, The "Monster" in All of Us: When Victims Become Perpetrators,38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
367, 382-84 (2005). While this Article falls squarely within that critique, it does so mindfully.
Similar arguments about the justice of individual punishments and the failure to consider the context
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of the rationales for criminal punishment in turn and applying them to the
case of Dixie Shanahan. Would punishing Dixie Shanahan deter future
crime-either by her or by other battered women? Does her punishment
serve some retributive function? Will Dixie Shanahan be rehabilitated as
a result of her punishment? Is Dixie Shanahan's incapacitation for
thirty-five years just? Examination of each of these rationales reveals
that only one, retributivism, provides sufficient justification for
punishing Dixie Shanahan and other battered women who kill, and only
to the extent that they receive their just deserts-punishments
proportionate to the crime, considering the entire context for the crime.
Because the fifty-year sentence she received is not a just desert, the
punishment actually imposed on Dixie Shanahan was not just.
Like many battered women who kill, Dixie Shanahan received an
unjust sentence. In Dixie Shanahan's case, that injustice was largely a
function of mandatory minimum sentences. Though he agreed with the
verdict, denying a defense motion for a new trial, Judge Smith was
frustrated by his lack of sentencing options. At sentencing, Judge Smith
told Dixie Shanahan that because of mandatory minimum sentences
enacted by the Iowa Legislature, he did not have the ability to impose a
lighter sentence (like probation) or suspend her sentence-punishments
he believed more appropriate. 8 He stated, "This matter is a tragedy in
every sense. You've suffered abuse, one person is dead and now you're
looking at almost a lifetime of jail. None of that is necessary." 9 While
the fifty-year
sentence was legal, according to Judge Smith it was also
"wrong."' 0 Left without alternatives, Judge Smith was unable to exercise
any discretion in sentencing, despite the years of abuse Dixie Shanahan
suffered and despite his belief that a long period of incarceration was
inappropriate.
But what accounts for the injustice done to battered women who kill
in jurisdictions without such stringent sentencing requirements? In those
cases, judicial skepticism concerning evidence of abuse and (unfounded)
fears of an epidemic of homicides may drive judges to impose unjust
sentences. Judges either refuse to hear evidence about the battering these
for their crimes in imposing punishment could be made about any number of offenders involved
with the criminal system; as Smith notes, "[lI]t is the rare serious perpetrator who was not also a
victim. ... [I]t is the rare perpetrator who has not also suffered." Id. at 369. Smith further argues
that context is essential for understanding not only the victim's actions, but also her abuser's,
asserting that "[t]he same social and political conditions that give rise to violence against women
give rise to violence by men." Id.at 392.
8. Transcript of Sentencing at 5-6, Shanahan, No. FECR006475.
9. Id.at 9-10.
10. Id.at 8-9.
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women have suffered or hear that evidence but refuse to consider the
crime in the context of the abuse. Either way, crucial information that
would lead to the imposition of a "just desert" is excluded from
sentencing decisions. Finally, concerns about the impact of failing to
impose stringent sentences on women who kill their abusive partners
drive judges to mete out unjust sentences.
For Dixie Shanahan, as for other battered women who kill, there is
no justice. Context-examining the lives of Dixie Shanahan and other
women like her, and asking how they come to the point where killing
their batterers seems to be their only option-is crucial to establish why
most traditional rationales for criminal punishment are inadequate in
these cases. This Article begins with that context.

II. THE LIFE OF DIXIE SHANAHAN
Dixie Schrieber was born in Muscatine, Iowa, in 1967." In 1976,
Schrieber's mother married a man named Frank Street, who sexually
abused Dixie and her sisters for years until Dixie threatened to report the
abuse to police. 12 In 1984, the same year that Dixie threatened to report
her stepfather, she moved to Defiance, Iowa, to live with Al and Beverly
Feser, the parents of Scott Shanahan, whom she had begun dating in
1983.13 Both of the Fesers had physical infirmities. Dixie cared for them
and developed close, loving relationships with them; in fact, Dixie
said
4
mother.1
own
her
than
her
to
mother
a
like
more
that Beverly was
From the beginning of their relationship, Scott verbally and
physically abused Dixie. Although Dixie described this abuse as minor
compared to what she would later experience, in those early years Scott
was already beating her so severely that she was bruised. 15 But Dixie
was not his only victim; Scott also physically abused his mother,
Beverly, who had a heart condition and had undergone triple bypass
surgery.'6 Dixie described Scott's temper as unpredictable and likely to

1I. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at437-38.
12. Id. at 438-39. Battered women frequently come from homes where they have been
physically or sexually abused as children. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN
SYNDROME 8 (1984) ("[E]vents reported by the [battered] women ... included early and repeated
sexual molestation and assault, [and] high levels of violence by members in their childhood families
13. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 440, 442.
14. Id.at 440-42.
15. Id.at 443-44. Battering often increases in severity over time. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE & THE FAMILY, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 6 (1996).
16. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 441-43.
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explode over trivial matters, such as the lawnmower failing to start.' 7 In
1986, Scott beat Dixie for visiting her family, who she had not seen since
she moved to the Fesers' home in 1984.18
In 1988, Scott's mother developed pneumonia after attending her
brother-in-law's funeral; Scott reacted by beating Beverly so severely
that she was bruised from head to toe. 19 Around this time, Beverly
extracted a promise from Dixie that if anything ever happened to her,
Dixie would take care of Scott-a promise that Dixie took seriously
given the closeness of her relationship with Beverly. 20 During that same
period of time, Dixie estimates that Scott was beating both her and
Beverly about twice a week.2 1 Each time Scott experienced adversityhis mother's sickness, the death of his grandfather in 1993-the beatings
worsened.2 2 In 1994, when Beverly died, Scott 23
"[w]ent off the wall...
beating [Dixie] more frequently about anything.,
In 1995, Dixie Schrieber married Scott Shanahan.2 4 In 1996, their
son Zachary was born, 25 followed by Ashley in 1998.26 Scott was
unhappy about the first pregnancy, worrying that they had no experience
caring for a child and that Dixie, the sole breadwinner, would have to
stop working.2 7 During Dixie's second pregnancy, after Dixie refused to
have an abortion, Scott beat her in the stomach, telling her that he was
going to get rid of the baby.28
Despite her promise to Beverly, Dixie left Scott on a number of
occasions, beginning in 1997.29 She always remembered her promise,
17. Id.at 444.
18. Id. at 447. Batterers seek to isolate their victims from sources of support, like family
members, in order to increase their control. PATRICIA GAGNt, BATTERED WOMEN'S JUSTICE: THE
MOVEMENT FOR CLEMENCY AND THE POLITICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 19 (1998).

19. Transcript of Trial, supranote 3, at 451.
20. Id. at 452.
21. Id.at 453.
22. Id. at 456.
23. Id. at 457.
24. Id.at 446.
25. Id.at 448.
26. Id.at 458.
27. Id.at 448-49.
28. Id.at 458-59. A coworker of Dixie's confirmed that when Dixie was eight months
pregnant with Ashley, she saw bruises and red marks on Dixie's stomach that Dixie told her Scott
had caused. Id.at 658-59. Battering often begins or increases in intensity when the victim becomes
pregnant, and the fetus is frequently a target of the beatings. See Donna St. George, Many New or
Expectant Mothers Die Violent Deaths, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2004, at Al (reporting that for
twenty-seven percent of abused women, abuse began during pregnancy and that for two-thirds of
homicides of pregnant women, there was a "strong relation to pregnancy or... a domestic violenceclash in which pregnancy may have been a factor").
29. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 457-58.
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however, and felt badly for leaving. "I had promised I would take care
of him and I felt I wasn't doing that for her.' 30 Dixie also worried about
her children growing up without a father.31 Each time she left, Scott
would call Dixie, her family, and her friends relentlessly, asking her to
come back and her friends to urge her to do so. 32 He promised to change,
to get counseling, to "do whatever it took to keep our marriage
together." 33 And each time, Scott would change for a few months, would
go to counseling, and would take his medication.34 But the beatings
35
always resumed, becoming more severe, causing more serious injury.
Although the beatings were a regular feature of Dixie's life with
Scott, a number of particularly horrible incidents stood out in her
testimony. The time that Scott threw her down the basement steps,
chipping her front teeth (which remained chipped at the time of her trial,
a number of years later).36 The time that Scott stuck her head in a toilet
and told her that he would flush her head down the toilet, while her
children watched.37 The time that Scott beat her on the top of the head
with a cowboy boot. 38 The time that Scott, angry about a red T-shirt that
Dixie was wearing, poked her in the eye, causing the eye to bleed. 39 The
three times that Scott tied Dixie up, leaving her in their basement for up
to two days, not allowing her to go to the bathroom, telling her, "You
know, I could let you just sit here and die . ..and nobody would know
the difference. 40
30. Id.
31. Id. at 457. Many victims cite concern for their children as a reason for remaining in an
abusive relationship. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 110 (1987).
32. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 675-76, 683. Coworkers and friends testified that Scott
called repeatedly, asking and then demanding information about Dixie's whereabouts. Id.
33. Id.at 449-50, 459-60, 473-74.
34. Id.at459, 461-62, 474.
35. Id. at 450, 462. In the classic cycle of violence described by Dr. Lenore Walker in her 1984
book THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, the acute battering phase is followed by a honeymoon

phase, during which the batterer vows to change and shows remorse for his behavior. WALKER,
supra note 12, at 95-104. While the batterer may exhibit a short-term change, most frequently the
violence begins again-and increases in intensity. Id.
36. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 460.
37. Id.at461.
38. Id.A coworker, Kristy Wessel, testified that Dixie told her she had a terrible headache as a
result of being beaten with a cowboy boot. Wessel touched the top of Dixie's head and felt a
number of lumps there that were painful to the touch. Id.at 673-74.
39. Id.at 469.
40. Id.at 466-68. Two of these incidents followed Dixie's statements that she was going to
leave Scott. Id.at 467-68. Violence often increases when the victim attempts to separate from her
barterer; the batterer perceives he is losing control and uses physical violence to reinforce his control
over his victim. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women. Redefining the Issue of
Separation,90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53-60 (1991) (describing how the batterer's loss of control over the
victim at the time of separation can create grave danger for the victim).
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Two doors in the Shanahan home were damaged when Scott
smashed Dixie's head into them--damage that still existed at the time of
her trial.4' Scott smashed a plate of mashed potatoes over Dixie's head,
complaining that they were runny.42 He ran over her legs with a lawn
tractor.4 3 He bit her, leaving a huge bruise on her leg." He threw tools
at her face, causing a black eye. 45 All of these incidents were in addition
to the regular beatings. Scott also verbally abused Dixie, both privately
and publicly, telling her friends they should teach her to be better in bed
because she was terrible, no good, and worthless.46
Although Dixie recalled being beaten regularly over the course of
their relationship, she reported the abuse to the police on only three
occasions, the first in May of 1997. 47 After punching her in the face and
slamming her head into the window of their car, he threatened to take
their son, Zachary, and leave so that Dixie would never see the boy
again.48 On that occasion, Scott pled guilty to domestic abuse assault
and was sentenced to thirty days in jail "with all but two days suspended
and

. . .

given credit for time served.

'49

On September 8, 1997, Dixie

again asked the police for help after Scott struck her head and legs with a
metal object, causing her to bleed from the ear.50 Dixie told police at that
41. Transcript of Trial, supranote 3, at 463-64.
42. Id. at 476.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.at 477.
46. Id. Numerous witnesses testified to Scott's reputation for anger and to Dixie's injuries. Id.
at 615-19, 623-24, 628-29, 636, 641-42, 648-49, 652-55. Coworkers testified that she always
wore long sleeves to work in the summer to cover the bruises on her arms. Id. at 632, 677. The
Shanahans' neighbor testified that on more than one occasion she heard Scott yelling obscenities and
threats at another person and a female voice screaming in pain. Id.at 687-88.
47. Id. at 178-80, 445. Aaron Anderson, a former Shelby County deputy sheriff, confirmed
that Dixie Shanahan called for assistance in May of 1997 after Scott Shanahan back-handed Dixie
across the face with a closed fist, bruising her eye and bloodying her lip. Id. at 178-80. He also
recalled Dixie telling him that the abuse "had been going on for some time." Id.at 178-80. Scott
Shanahan was arrested the following day. Id.at 180, 710-11. Police had also received an earlier
report, on November 19, 1996, from an attorney in Harlan telling them to take any report of
domestic abuse from the Shanahan home seriously. Id. at 209, 709. That report came from Susan
Christensen. Id.at 709; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the testimony of Susan Christensen).
48. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 446.
49. ld.at 216-17. A no contact order was entered in the case; Dixie requested that that order be
lifted in July 1997, saying,
I am no longer afraid that I will-that he will hurt me and I would like to keep my
marriage together and with the restraining order this is not possible to try. He is in
counciling (sic) now and I feel this is helping him. We have a [nine] month old son so if
at all possible I would like this lifted so we can work this out.
Id. at 217. The court lifted the order the next day. See id.at 217 (stating that the application was
filed on July 1 and the order lifted on July 2).
50. Id. at 186-87.

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

time that she was pregnant and afraid that Scott would cause her to lose
the baby.5' Scott pled guilty to domestic abuse assault (an aggravated
misdemeanor) and "was sentenced to serve52 two years in the state
penitentiary with all but four days suspended.
The final police interaction with the Shanahans prior to August 2002
occurred on October 9, 2000."3 Dixie's friends tried to enter the home;
Scott would not let them in and they called the police.5 4 When the
deputies arrived, Scott refused to open the door and put Dixie and the
children in a closet, holding the door closed with his foot. 55 A friend
remembered, however, that Dixie kept a key hidden in back of the house
and the deputies used the key to enter and arrest Scott. 56 Deputy Sheriff
Mark Hervey observed that Dixie had two black eyes. 57 Dixie told
Hervey that one had been caused when Scott threw a VCR tape at her;
the other resulted from being poked in the eye. 58 Dixie also showed
Deputy Hervey the hole in the door that Scott made with her head.59
Deputies arrested Scott and charged him with false imprisonment and
felony domestic abuse assault with injury. 60 Dixie fled to Texas, where
she stayed until April 2001.61 In the interim, Scott repeatedly contacted
her in violation of the no contact order entered in the criminal case,62
51. Id. at 205.
52. Id. at 222. Dixie had asked for the charges against Scott to be dropped, stating,
I know he has been attending his BEP classes as required and also on his own has been
seeing a councler (sic) and a psychiatrist so he has been-so he is making every effort to
get help. I cannot see where jail time would be beneficial to him at all.
In all fairness some of the things I said were exaggerated and this whole thing has
been blown out of proportion.
ld at 221. On cross-examination, Vicky Krohn, the clerk of court for Shelby County, acknowledged
that many victims of violence ask that domestic violence complaints be dismissed, a point Susan
Christensen also grudgingly conceded. Id. at 226, 730-31. In fact, victim reluctance to assist with
prosecution is so common that prosecutors developed "victimless" prosecution techniques in order to
proceed with domestic violence cases even when the victim declines to cooperate. See, e.g., Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1860-65 (1996) (discussing aggressive prosecution policies and their impact
on domestic abuse).
53. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 189-92 (describing police arrival and entry into the
house).
54. Id.at 470-72.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.at 191.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 193.
60. Id at 196.
61. Id.at472.
62. Id.at 209. Deputy Hervey testified that he knew Scott had been contacting Dixie in Texas,
in violation of the no contact order. Id. Teresa Merritt, a friend of Dixie's, testified that while Dixie
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begged her to come back, and threatened to kill himself.63 Scott finally
went to Texas to convince Dixie that he could be a good husband and to
tell her that he had hepatitis A and was going to die.64 Dixie refused to
return to Defiance to testify against Scott, and the charges against him
were dismissed.6 5 But after Scott's repeated entreaties, Dixie later
returned to Defiance.66
By August 2002, Dixie was being physically abused three to four
times weekly, leaving her badly bruised.6 7 She also learned that once
again, she was pregnant. Scott, enraged, demanded that she have an
abortion. Dixie refused.68 Scott repeatedly beat Dixie and told her that
she was not going to have the baby, that he would make sure that she
would not have the baby, and that there was nothing she could do about
it.69 On August 30, angry because Dixie failed to wake him before their
son, Zachary, left for the school bus, Scott began beating Dixie's70
stomach, screaming, "I'm gonna' kill this baby one way or another"
while their daughter, Ashley, watched. 7' Dixie sent Ashley to a friend's
house and tried to leave the house herself.72 Scott took her car keys,
knocked her to the ground, and dragged her into the house by her hair,
pulling chunks of hair out of her head.73 He then 74punched her stomach
again, screaming that she would not have the baby.
Scott left the room as Dixie lay on the floor crying.75 He returned
with a shotgun, enraged, visibly shaking, and calling Dixie obscene
names. 76 He jammed two different shells into the gun, then pointed the
gun at Dixie, and said, "This day is not over yet. I will kill you. ' 77 Dixie
was in Texas, Scott admitted to beating Dixie and the children and tying Dixie up in the basement.
He said he did not blame her for leaving. Id. at 642.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 472-74. Deputy Sheriff John Kelly testified that on Christmas Eve, 2000, he
responded to a call about a suicide threat at the Shanahan residence. Kelly found Scott Shanahan
there, alone, visibly upset and shaking, saying that he had nothing to live for if he did not get Dixie
back and because she was not there. Id. at 277-79.
65. Id. at 199.
66. Id. at 474.
67. Id. at 479-80.
68. Id. at 480.
69. Id. at 481.
70. Id. at 482-83.
71. See id. at 483 (containing Dixie's statement that she "sent Ashley out of the house 'cuz
[she] didn't want her to see" the beating).
72. Id. at 483-84.
73. Id. at 484.
74. Id. at 484-85.
75. Id. at 485.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 485-87. The prosecution suggested that Dixie, who had no experience with shotguns,
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was sure that he would shoot her, but he did not; instead, Scott began
beating her again, threatening to kill her and the baby.78 At some point,
Scott also removed the phones from their jacks. When he stopped
beating Dixie, he went into the bedroom, taking the 79
phones with him.
The only working phone was in the bedroom with him.
Dixie decided she needed to call the police and went into the
bedroom to attempt to use the phone. 80 As she tried to grab the phone,
Scott moved towards her.8' Seeing the shotgun near the phone, Dixie
grabbed it, closed her eyes, and shot Scott.82 Dixie testified that she
believed that Scott was coming for her again and that she had no other
choice, that the only way to protect herself and her unborn child was to
shoot Scott Shanahan.83 She then sat in a chair outside the bedroom for a
few hours, wondering what she was going to do. 84 Ultimately, she put
the gun in the closet of the children's bedroom, shut the door to the
bedroom where Scott lay dead on the bed, put a towel underneath the
door, and went back to the chair, where she sat until her daughter came
home that afternoon.8 5 She never told anyone that Scott was in the
bedroom, 86 where he remained until the police searched her home on
October 20, 2003.87

1II.

DIXIE SHANAHAN IN THE CONTEXT OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO
KILL

Dixie Shanahan's case became notorious because Scott lay dead in
the back bedroom of her home for eighteen months while she and her
children continued to live in the house. Without that sensational detail,
her story would not have been significantly different from those of the
thousands of other women currently serving sentences for killing their
abusive partners. What transforms these women from victims of severe
abuse to killers?
accidentally loaded the gun with the two different sized shells prior to shooting Scott. Id. at 789-90.
78. Id. at 487.
79. Id. at 488.
80. Id.
81. Id. at489.
82. Id. at 489, 553. The prosecution contended that Scott was asleep on the bed when Dixie
killed him; Dixie repeatedly testified that Scott was awake and made a move toward her. Id. at 555,
559, 561,564, 789.
83. 1d.at 489-90.
84. Id. at 490.
85. Id. at 490-92.
86. Id. at 492.
87. See id. at 200 (explaining how the police found Scott Shanahan on October 20, 2003).
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UnderstandingBattered Women Who Kill

Studies consistently find that large percentages of the women
incarcerated for murder or manslaughter are in prison because they killed
intimate partners who had abused them.88 Many of these women-like
Dixie Shanahan-are
first-time offenders who have no prior history of
89
violence.

Battered women who kill share a number of characteristics. Few
have resorted to violence against their abusers in the past. As Angela
Browne notes, "Women charged in the death of a mate have the least
extensive criminal records of any female offenders." 90 Most have
endured repeated, severe abuse over a period of years.9 1 At some point,
the violence against them escalated to a level where the battered woman
believed that if she did not kill her abuser, she would be killed.92 Lenore
Walker explains, "Battered women who kill their abusers do so as a last
resort., 93 Sue Ostoff, who has represented more than 350 women who
have killed their abusers, agrees: "'I've met only one woman who
wanted to kill her husband. Battered women don't want to do it. And

88.

See, e.g., CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., BREAKING THE SILENCE: WOMEN IN PRISON = UNEQUAL

JUSTICE 3
(1991),
available at
http://www.bamard.columbia.edu/bcrw/archive/prison/
BreakTheSilence.pdf [hereinafter BREAKING THE SILENCE] (reporting a New York State Survey's
finding that 49% of women committed to New York prisons for homicide in 1986 were victims of
abuse and that the abuser was living with or married to the woman in 89% of those cases);
CHRISTOPHER A. INNES & LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT STATE

PRISONERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 6 tbl.12 (1990) (reporting that 37.7% of the homicide victims of
first-time female offenders in state prisons were spouses, ex-spouses, or other intimates of the
offender); NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEF. OF BATTERED WOMEN, STATISTICS PACKET 53 (3d

ed. 1994) (reporting that 40% of the women incarcerated in Chicago "for murder had killed partners
who had repeatedly abused them"); Kathleen A. O'Shea, Women on Death Row, in WOMEN
PRISONERS: A FORGOTTEN POPULATION 75, 85 (Beverly R. Fletcher et al. eds., 1993) (reporting
1992 data showing that, of the 235 women incarcerated for homicide in Georgia, 44% killed a
husband or lover, and that 46 of these women were abused by their partners). Of the 70,300 women
incarcerated in state prisons in 1998, just over 11% were in prison for homicide. ALLEN J. BECK,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1999, at 10 tl. 15 (2000).
89. See Press Release, Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., New York Group Calls on State Lawmakers to
Release Women in Prison (Mar. 4, 1991), reprinted in BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 88, at 6
(noting that for over half the women convicted of homicide in 1986 in New York state prisons, this
was their first and only offense).
90. BROWNE, supra note 31, at 11.
91. See GAGNE, supra note 18, at 24 ("Many battered women live with violence and abuse for
years.").
92. Id.at 28; Linda L. Ammons, Dealing with the Nastiness: Mixing Feminism and Criminal
Law in the Review of Cases of Battered Incarcerated Women-A Tenth- Year Reflection, 4 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 891, 913 (2001).
93. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How

SOCIETY RESPONDS 5 (1989).
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they won't do it if they don't absolutely have to.' ' 9 4 One battered
woman who killed her partner described her experience: "'I would have
been dead, in a short time, Tommy would have killed me. I know he
would have. I know he would have.' 95
Battered women who kill have frequently tried to leave their abusers
but have found that police, clergy, courts, shelters, or other resources
were either not available or not helpful in stopping the violence.96 In
addition, battered women are aware of the tenuous nature of the
protection available through the legal system. They read newspaper
stories and watch television accounts about women who have called the
police and obtained orders of protection, only to be killed by their
abusers. 97 "When 'media tragedies' like these hit the news, battered
women get the message: the system that fails to protect
them from
98
assault at home will not protect them when they leave.,

94. ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 346-47 (1996).
95. AMY Lou BUSCH, FINDING THEIR VOICES: LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN WHO'VE
KILLED 53 (1999).

96. See BROWNE, supra note 31, at 159, 170 ("A lack of effective legal protection from assaults
and threats by marital partners sets up the conditions whereby victims may finally believe it
necessary to protect themselves."); GAGNt, supra note 18, at 27 ("Although the wife may have
called the police on many occasions, sought help from clergy, and left home, over time she may have
learned that help was not available and that permanently escaping from the relationship with several
children was impossible for her."). One study suggests that battered women leave but return to their
relationships unwillingly-because of threats or further violence, for their children, or because they
have no other place to go. JONES, supra note 94, at 297. For a discussion of barriers to leaving
abusive relationships, see BROWNE, supra note 31, at 109-28; GAGNt, supra note 18, at 81-82.
97. Legislators in North Carolina have crafted an ironic solution to this problem. Recognizing
that a protective order "[too often ... amounts to a useless piece of paper," North Carolina recently
passed a law making it easier for victims of domestic violence to obtain emergency concealed
handgun permits so long as the sheriff agrees. Editorial, Gun May Raise Risks, GREENSBORO NEWS
& REC. (N.C.), Aug. 20, 2005, at A8. Governor Mike Easley signed the bill, but asked the
legislature to remove language that required court clerks to inform women getting protective orders
about the provision. Amy Gardner, Domestic Violence Bill Signed, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Aug. 30, 2005, at lB. Of course, if these women choose to use their weapons to protect
themselves, they may find themselves in the same situation as Dixie Shanahan and other battered
women who have killed, trying to persuade juries that their lives were in imminent danger. See Joan
Ryan, A Woman, a Batterer and a Gun, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2006, at B 1 (describing how a battered
woman who carried a concealed weapon was convicted of carrying a loaded gun when her protective
order expired).
98. JONES, supra note 94, at 345. Yvette Cade's case provides a graphic, horrifying example of
the system's failure to protect a battered woman. On September 19, 2005, Judge Richard A.
Palumbo vacated Yvette Cade's protective order against her husband, Roger Hargrave. Allison
Klein & Ruben Castaneda, Md.Victim ofBurning Told Judge of Fears, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005,
at B 1. Ms. Cade pleaded with the judge not to lift the order, telling the judge that her husband
continued to terrorize her and her daughter. Id.When Ms. Cade told the judge that she wanted to
divorce her husband (instead of entering counseling with him, as Mr. Hargrave had suggested in his
motion to vacate the order), Judge Palumbo responded that he wanted "'to be six-foot-five,. . . [biut
that's not what we do here."' Id.Judge Palumbo told Ms. Cade that she needed to hire an attorney
and go to divorce court-ignoring that her pleas for continued protection related not to her desire for
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Angela Browne identifies a number of variables that make battered
women more likely to kill their partners. These include the increased
frequency of abusive incidents, the severity of the woman's injuries, the
frequency of forced or threatened sexual acts, the man's drug use or
frequent intoxication, an increase in the man's threats to kill, and the
woman's threats of suicide. 99 Battered women who kill frequently report
the destruction of their pets; these women believe that the murder of a
pet represents their own imminent deaths.100 All of these variables point
to the escalating danger these women perceived and their increasing
beliefs that they would be unable to escape. Browne explains,
[T]he women's behavior seemed to be primarily in reaction to the level
of threat and violence coming in.

Women in the homicide group

reported that they had felt hopelessly trapped in a desperate situation, in
which staying meant the possibility of being killed, but attempting to
leave also carried with it the threat of reprisal or death. Their sense of
escalated along with the assaultive
helplessness and desperation
10
behavior of their partners. '

Browne uses social judgment theory to explain the thought processes
of battered women before they kill.102 Browne argues that a "latitude of
acceptance" defines what battered women believe they can live
through. 10 3 The parameters of that latitude constantly shift to assimilate
attacks that previously they would not have believed they could
survive. 10 4 When acts occur that the women perceive as significantly
outside of the "normal" range of violence (a change in the pattern of
violence, or more brutal behavior) or that is beyond the range of what
they can assimilate (like child abuse), that "contrast phenomena"
indicates to the women that their deaths are imminent.0 5 At that
moment, "[t]heir final hope had been removed. They did not believe

a divorce, but to the violence against her-and dismissed the order that Ms. Cade obtained in July.
Id. Three weeks later, Mr. Hargrave entered the T-Mobile store where Ms. Cade worked, poured
gasoline on her, and set her on fire. Id. Ms. Cade remained hospitalized with third degree bums to
see also Betty Cuniberti, Kelli
her face and more than half of her upper body for months. Id.;
Alexander Did Everything Right. Did It Have to Cost HerLife?, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 2,
2005, at El (describing how the system also failed to protect Kelli Alexander).
99. BROWNE, supra note 31, at 127.
100. Id. at 157.
101. Id.at 127.
102. Id.
at 128.
at 128-30.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 128-29.
105. Id.
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they could escape the abusive situation
and survive, and now they could
10 6
no longer survive within it either."
Battered women are particularly likely to kill when they perceive
that their own lives or the lives of their children are immediately
This fight or flight 'response should be seen as
imperiled. 10 7
psychologically normal, Lenore Walker argues: "Defending oneself from
reasonably perceived imminent danger of bodily harm or death ought to
be considered a psychologically healthy response. 1 0 8 But the women do
not necessarily make a conscious decision to save themselves at the
expense of their partners; while they may have had "an absolute
conviction that death was inevitable within a certain timeframe," the
women usually believed that they or their children, and not the abuser,
would be the victims if someone died. 10 9 As Browne explains,
"Typically the killing of the abuser was unplanned and occurred in the
midst of an attack against the woman, during the warning phase when it
became apparent that an attack was about to begin, or during an escape
attempt by the woman." 110 And what of battered women who kill their
partners after an attack or while they sleep? Browne explains that
"[t]hese delayed homicides were often related to an explicit threat by the
abuser to 'get' the woman or a child within a specific time; women killed
the abuser to avert the threatened outcome.""'
The abuser's power over a battered woman who kills may be so great
that the woman continues to believe the abuser is dangerous even after he
is dead and takes measures to protect herself. As Browne notes, "One
woman locked her husband's body in the closet after she shot him: As
long as she could see him, she was afraid he was going to reach out and
grab her." ' 1 2 Walker states, "Even after a homicide, denial and the
battered woman's belief in the omniscience of her batterer serve to

106. Id.at 130.
107. GAGNE, supra note 18, at 24.
108. WALKER, supra note 93, at 169.
109. BROWNE, supra note 31, at 135.
110. Id. at 135-36. A review of the social science literature suggests that over seventy percent
of battered women who kill do so either during an attack or when facing imminent death or serious
bodily injury; the number may actually be closer to ninety percent. Holly Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L.
REV.379, 384 (1991).
111. BROWNE, supra note 31, at 136. One commentator suggests that battered women kill when
their partners are sleeping or not expecting to be attacked to overcome differences in physical size
and strength. Bobbi J. Vilachd, More Than Victims: Battered Women, the Syndrome Society, and the
Law, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 43, 44 (1998) (book review).
112. BROWNE, supranote31,at 141.
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deaden death's effect."' 13 When they are able to come to grips with what
they have done, however, battered women who kill most
often report
14
feeling sorrow and horror at the deaths of their partners.'
B. Dixie Shanahanas a "Typical" Battered Woman Who Kills
If such a thing as a "typical" battered woman who kills exists, Dixie
Shanahan seems to be one. She was a first-time offender with no history
of violence; she was a nurturing woman whose work involved caring for
the elderly and frail in nursing homes. Scott Shanahan abused her for the
entire nineteen years of their relationship, abuse that escalated in both
frequency and severity over time. Dixie repeatedly tried to leave Scott,
turning to family and friends for assistance, fleeing the state, but
ultimately being begged and bullied back to him each time, with her
promise to his mother Bev echoing in her head.
Particularly noteworthy, and consistent with the experiences of other
battered women who have killed, was the response of the legal system to
Scott's repeated abuse. At the murder trial, Susan Christensen, the
assistant county attorney for Shelby County, testified to her interactions
In her role as assistant county attorney,
with Dixie Shanahan.
Christensen was responsible for prosecuting misdemeanor domestic
violence cases."15 Christensen also maintained a private practice,
specializing in family law. 1 6 Christensen told the jury that she met with
Dixie Shanahan in November 1996, when Dixie came to her seeking
advice about how to handle Scott's violence. Christensen advised Dixie
to petition the court for a civil protective order' '7 and discussed
instituting criminal proceedings with her. Christensen testified that while
Dixie was not ready to lodge criminal charges against Scott, she did
begin to fill out the papers for a protective order." 8 After that
conversation, Christensen was sufficiently concerned for Dixie's safety
that she called the sheriffs office and told them that if they got a call
' 9
from the Shanahan home, "they should take it very seriously." "
113.
114.

WALKER, supra note 93, at 73.
BROWNE, supra note 31, at 141.

115. Transcript ofTrial, supra note 3, at 698.
116. Id. at 700. Christensen estimated that about a quarter of her family law cases involved
domestic violence. Id.
117. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 811-14 (1993)

(discussing uses of civil protection orders).
118. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 707. In Iowa, such orders are known as 236 orders. Id.
119. Id at709.
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Christensen later learned that Dixie never returned to the clerks' office to
complete the paperwork. 120 Three months later, however, Dixie went to
court and was granted a protective order, which was in place at the time
of Scott's first criminal trial on June 23, 1997.121
Christensen described Dixie as initially cooperative during the first
criminal trial, which Christensen prosecuted. 122 On July 2, 1997,
however, after Scott pled guilty and served two days in jail for punching
Dixie, Dixie asked that the protective order be lifted. 123 While
Christensen testified that to her knowledge, no violation of the protective
order was ever reported, 124 a cursory glance at the timeline Christensen
provided makes it clear that if Dixie Shanahan obtained a protective
order three months after she first visited Christensen in November 1996
which was still in effect at the time of the trial, the events that caused
Scott Shanahan to plead guilty in June 1997 were a violation of that first
protective order.
Christensen again prosecuted Scott Shanahan when he was charged
with domestic abuse assault in September 1997, just three months after
his first conviction. 125 Dixie did not assist the prosecution on that
occasion; instead, she sent the court a letter stating that she had
126
exaggerated the violence and asking that the charges be dismissed.
But police reports reflect the seriousness of the injuries Dixie Shanahan
sustained and a sheriffs deputy photographed those
injuries. 127 On that
128
jail.
in
days
occasion, Scott Shanahan served four
Christensen was also involved with the third case against Scott
Shanahan, the felony prosecution in October 2000. After the incident
leading to that prosecution, Dixie fled to Texas, giving prosecutors
120. Id.at710.
121. Id. at 711.
122. Id. at 712.

123. Id. at 712-13. Dixie provided supporting documentation for the request from a clinical
psychologist at Prairie Rose Mental Health, which suggests that Scott had, as promised, sought
counseling. Id. at 713.
124. Id. at 714.
125. Id.

126. Id. at 715-16. Recantation is a recurrent theme in criminal prosecutions involving battered
women. Police and prosecutors have experimented with a number of policy solutions to that
problem, including victimless prosecution, no-drop prosecution policies, and compelling the victim's
attendance. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies:
PrioritizingVictims' Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 465,486-98 (2003) (discussing various prosecution policies).

127. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 187. Unfortunately, the testimony of the deputy who
responded, Brad McQueen, was not available, as he had sustained a head injury that impaired his
memory. Id. at 185.
128. Id. at 716.
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"some comfort knowing that there was some distance between the
two. ' 129 But that comfort turned to distress when Dixie refused to return
prosecutors were forced to drop the charges
from Texas to testify and
1 30
against Scott Shanahan.
Susan Christensen testified that she believed that if Dixie Shanahan
had cooperated with the third prosecution, the legal system would have
protected her, would have stopped the violence. Christensen stated,
"[T]here were choices that we gave Dixie, in particular, that she chose
not to take and those choices have been proven over and over to be
effective if allowed to take their course.' 13 1 But Christensen's own
testimony shows that Scott Shanahan was not the type of batterer who
was deterred by the legal system.1 32 Dixie got a restraining order. Scott
violated it. 133 She pursued criminal charges. Scott served two days in
34
jail, was ordered to participate in batterer's intervention counseling,'
and nonetheless was arrested and convicted again for assaulting Dixie
just three months later. On that occasion, he served four days in jail.
When he was released, he began abusing Dixie anew.' 35 What was the
sum total of Dixie Shanahan's experiences with the legal system? Three
cases, six days in jail, and one order that Scott attend counseling. The
violence continued unabated, increasing in frequency and severity, in
129. Id. at 717-18.
130. Id. at 718-19.
131. Id. at 728. Not everyone shares Christensen's belief in the effectiveness of these strategies.
For a discussion of the many ways that the legal system can fail battered women, see generally Leigh
Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure? Questioning the Efficacy of Legal
Interventionsfor Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2004).
132. Abusive men with violent criminal histories-like Scott Shanahan-are more likely to
violate protective orders than other men. Joan Zorza & Nancy K.D. Lemon, Two-Thirds of Civil
Protection Orders Are Never Violated; Better Court and Community Services Increase Success
Rates, in VIOLENCE

AGAINST

WOMEN:

LAW,

PREVENTION,

PROTECTION,

ENFORCEMENT,

TREATMENT, HEALTH 28-1, 28-1 to -2 (Joan Zorza ed., 2002). As Judge Albert Kramer, of the
Quincy, Massachusetts District Court notes, "'There is no other group of perpetrators of violence
that is more tenaciously resistant to court orders and court efforts to curb their violence and prevent
their almost relentless pursuit of their victims."' JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE
COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSE 85 (1999).

133. Scott Shanahan not only violated the first protective order, as Susan Christensen's
testimony shows, but also the no contact order that had been filed at the time of the third
prosecution. Deputy Mark Hervey testified that he had heard that Scott had been contacting Dixie in
Texas in violation of the no contact order, but apparently Hervey took no action. Transcript of Trial,
supra note 3, at 209.
134. Id. at 712-13.
135. Christensen admitted on cross-examination that in her experience, about half of the women
who got restraining orders reported further problems. The other half either experienced no
difficulties or simply did not report them. Id. at 733. These numbers refute Christensen's assertion
that legal action can be counted on to prevent further abuse. Christensen also acknowledged that
many victims of violence have little faith in the ability of protective orders to keep them safe. Id. at
736.
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spite of those interventions. By the time of the third criminal case, Dixie
Shanahan knew the legal system could not or would not keep Scott
Shanahan from abusing her. It is hardly surprising she chose to remain
in Texas rather than returning to Iowa to cooperate with the third
prosecution. Like many battered women who kill, it must have been
clear to Dixie Shanahan
that the police and courts had little to offer her
36
by way of protection.'
By August of 2002, the abuse against Dixie Shanahan reached new
levels of frequency and severity. Scott's threats to kill her became more
frequent. And on August 30, 2002, Dixie was finally confronted by
abuse that she could not assimilate-the credible threat to kill her unborn
child. Scott repeatedly threatened to kill both Dixie and the baby, telling
her they would be dead before the day was over. It was the certainty that
Scott would kill her unborn child that day that finally led Dixie to strike
back.137 Dixie's actions were consistent with those of other battered
women who kill not in the midst of a battering incident, but during a lull,
having been told that the batterer will begin the violence again, and
knowing that this time he will not stop until she and her unborn child are
dead.
So Dixie Shanahan shot and killed Scott Shanahan, and the criminal
justice system, which never adequately protected her, found her guilty of
second-degree murder and sentenced her to fifty years of imprisonment.
The conviction was certainly a legally permissible outcome. The
evidence was sufficient for a jury to find, beyond a shadow of a doubt,
that Dixie Shanahan committed second-degree murder.
But the
conclusion that the verdict was legally sound should not be the end of the
analysis, as the residents of Defiance, Iowa, stunned by the sentence,
recognized. The next Part asks: Even if she was legally culpable for his
death, was punishing Dixie Shanahan for shooting Scott Shanahan just?

136. Dixie lacked access to other resources to escape the violence. Because of the lack of
services for battered women in rural Iowa, Dixie would have needed to travel at least forty miles to
access services. Jeff Eckhoff, Most Iowa Counties Lack Havens for Women, DES MOINES REG.,

May 1, 2004, at IA.
137. Before Dixie disclosed to anyone that she killed Scott, she told friends and acquaintances
he had left the home on her demand. Kathryn Myers testified that Dixie told her she wanted Scott
out of her life because she was afraid for her unborn child's life. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at
314. When Dixie finally confessed to Kathryn Myers that she shot Scott, shortly before the police
apprehended her, she clutched her stomach, as if to protect that child, named Brittany. Id. at 326.
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IV. JUSTICE AND THE PUNISHMENT OF DIXIE SHANAHAN
Criminal punishment is "the infliction by state authority of a
consequence normally regarded as an evil (e.g., death or imprisonment)
on an individual found to be legally guilty of a crime." 138 Punishments
are generally unwelcome to the recipient; intentional and imposed for a
reason; ordered by those regarded as having a right to do so; inflicted as
a result of an infringement of law, rule, or custom; imposed upon
someone who played a voluntary part (or is viewed as having played a
voluntary part) in the infringement; justified by the punisher; and
intended to be perceived as punishment by the punisher.' 39 Punishment
in the criminal system can be justified under a number of theories. If,
however, a punishment satisfies none of those theories, that punishment
cannot be considered just. This Part reviews the four major theories
underpinning criminal punishment in the United States, then asks
whether punishing Dixie Shanahan was justified under any of those
theories.
A.

Theories of CriminalPunishment

Criminal punishment is generally justified by one of four theories:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation., 40 Each of
these theories will be considered in turn, then applied to the case of Dixie
Shanahan.

138. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
TO JURISPRUDENCE 123 (1984).

139. NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 1-3 (1991). H.L.A. Hart defines punishment as involving
pain or other unpleasant consequences, for an offense against legal rules, of an actual or supposed
offender for that offense, intentionally administered by someone other than the offender, and
imposed by the legal system. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4-5 (1968). Herbert Packer adds that punishment is "imposed for the
dominant purpose of preventing offenses against legal rules or of exacting retribution." HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 31 (1968). Critics of criminal punishment
counter that there is no consensus about the nature or functions of punishment, that punishment can
just as easily be seen as a means of perpetuating an unjust status quo or oppressing citizens as it can
"a reaffirmation of the community's ethical values" or a defense against anarchy. AM. FRIENDS
SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 10 (1971).
140. Leon Radzinowicz argues that looking for a single justification for punishment is as useless
as looking for a single cause of crime. LEON RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 115 (1966).
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1. Retribution
Retribution is the oldest moral underpinning for criminal
punishment, dating back to the Code of Hammurabi, developed by the
Babylonians around the eighteenth century B.C.14 1 The lex talionis, or
-law of retaliation, limited all sentences to punishment proportionate to
the crime-an eye for an eye, a life for a life. 142 Retributive theory has
since evolved to include a number of different moral justifications for
criminal punishment, all resting on the notion that punishment is
necessary to give the criminal what she deserves as a result of her
wrongdoing. The notions of criminals paying for their crimes, paying
their debts to society, or getting what is coming to them all grow out of
retributive theory.' 43 While modem retributive theory no longer requires
"eye for an eye" punishment, it continues to maintain that punishment
should be proportionate to the crime committed. 144
"Retributive conceptions of criminal punishment rest essentially on
the inherent propriety of punishment as a consequence of wrongdoing,
that is, it amounts to an obligation to be settled in an accounting among
the offender, the victim, and society."' 145 While that obligation is at the
core of retributivist theory, theorists have posited a number of different
explanations for why that obligation exists. 1 46 According to Emmanuel
Kant, for example, punishment was a categorical imperative; the
imposition of punishment was not just permissible, but morally required
simply because wrongdoing had occurred. 47 Punishment restores the

141.

KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15

(1989).
142. Id. at 16.
143.

PACKER, supra note 139, at 10.

144. HART, supra note 139, at 234. Retributive theorists argue that retribution should not be
confused with revenge. Some key differences: retribution rights a wrong, while revenge can be for
something other than a moral wrong; retribution sets limits to the appropriate punishment, while
revenge can be (and frequently intentionally is) disproportionate; revenge is personal, while
retribution does not rely on personal ties; revenge involves pleasure in the suffering of another, while
retribution lacks this emotionalism; revenge is not general-the avenger is not committed to seeking
it again in similar circumstances; retribution is visited only upon the wrongdoer, while revenge can
involve innocent persons close to the person revenge is being sought against. C.L. TEN, CRIME,
GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 42-43 (1987).

One prominent

retributive theorist now believes that the two may not be as separable as he previously believed,
however. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED 85 (1992).
145. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 139, at 48.

146.
147.

For an overview of these theories, see WALKER, supra note 139, at 73-82.
HART, supranote 139, at 232.
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moral balance that is upset when a crime occurs. 14 8 John Rawls states,
"[P]unishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits
punishment." 149 Others have similarly argued that the punishment
negates the wrongdoing, creating the sense that the wrongful act never
happened. 150 Building on this theory, "[p]unishment annuls crime in the
sense that it establishes that the victim has . . . rights, and hence the
criminal's denial of them is a mistake."' 51 Punishment, then, restores the
rights intruded upon by the criminal to the extent that the punishment
is
152
commensurate to the amount of intrusion created by the crime.
Another strain of retributive theory argues that "fairness' dictates that
a system in which benefits and burdens are equally distributed have a
mechanism designed to prevent a maldistribution in the benefits and
burdens. . . . [I]t is just to punish those who have violated the rules and
caused the unfair distribution of benefits and burdens.' ' 153 The benefits
need not be material, but rather can be the voluntary renunciation of
restraining oneself from violating the law. Punishment deprives the
offender of the ability to indulge his will by enjoying benefits made
possible because others have assumed the burden of following the law, a
burden the wrongdoer has renounced. 54 Allowing the criminal to profit
from his own wrongdoing is unjust not only to the victim, but to
everyone who abides by the law.' 55 Punishment can also serve as
communication with the offender under retributive theory. Robert
Nozick describes punishment as "a communicative act transmitting to the
wrongdoer . . . how wrong his conduct was."'156 "[R]etributive

148. Gertrude Ezorsky, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, at xvii
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
149.

John Rawls, Rule Utilitarianism (1), in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT,

supra note 148, at 82, 84.
150.

A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra

note 148, at 6, 7.
151.

TEN, supra note 144, at 39.

152. See RADZINOWICZ, supra note 140, at 10 ("'[E]veryone must suffer punishment so far to
invade the province of his own rights as the crime he committed has penetrated into that of
another."').
153. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
PUNISHMENT, supra note 148, at 116, 117.
154. TEN, supra note 144, at 55.
155. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 78 (1979). Murphy describes
the criminal as a free rider in the scheme of social cooperation, enjoying the benefits of the rule of
law without making the sacrifice of self-restraint required to sustain it. MURPHY, supra note 144, at

23.
156. TEN, supranote 144, at 42.
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punishment reconnects the offender with the correct values from which
'
his [act has alienated] him."157
The idea of desert is central to retributive theory. As C.S. Lewis
explained, "[T]he concept of Desert is the only connecting link between
punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that a
sentence can be just or unjust."'' 58 Desert is a moral concept, not a legal
one. "[A] legal code cannot suffice to determine what a criminal
deserves to suffer as a penalty. The misery he deserves depends on the
moral wrong he has committed."' 59 John Rawls concurs: "That a
criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and the severity of
160
the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of the act."
Desert should also be individualized;
as no two crimes are the same, no
16 1
two punishments should be.
Why is retribution preferable to other theories of punishment?
Retributivists argue that retribution "promises the certainty which
utilitarianism cannot. The punisher can be sure that whatever else he
may or may not be achieving he is at least inflicting more or less what
the offender deserves."' 162 Punishment in and of itself is the end of
retributivists; punishment need have no other benefit, either to the
individual being punished or to society. As Herbert Packer explains,
"[M]an is a responsible moral agent to whom rewards are due when he
makes right moral choices and to whom punishment is due when he
makes wrong ones. . . . These imperatives flow from the nature of man
and do not require-indeed do not permit-any pragmatic
justification.' ' 63 Others argue, however, that retributive theory debases
individuals to serve a theory.
The retributive view of punishment justifies the infliction of evil upon a
living soul, even though it will do neither him nor any one else any
good whatever. . . It is the retributive theory which shows a disrespect
for human personality by proposing to sacrifice human life and human
Well-being to a lifeless fetish styled the Moral Law, which apparently,

157. Id. at 45.
158. C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT:
VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 194, 195 (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany

eds., 1972).
159. Ezorsky, supra note 148, at xxii. Others argue, however, that desert can be either a moral
(desert as a requital of evil for evil) or legal (desert as giving back an unfair advantage) concept.
MOORE, supra note 141, at 77.
160. Rawls, supra note 149, at 84.
161.
162.

MOORE, supra note 141, at 77.
WALKER, supra note 139, at 67.

163.

PACKER, supra note 139, at 9.
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though unconscious, has a sense of dignity and demands the
immolation of victims to avenge its injured amourproper.164

2.

Utilitarian Theories of Punishment

The other three primary rationales for criminal punishment are
utilitarian theories.
The utilitarian view of punishment is that
punishment always creates suffering, and suffering is always evil; there
is no justification for suffering (and therefore, punishment) unless some
secular good flows from that suffering.1 65 Punishment is justified only to
the extent that it prevents or reduces the incidence of antisocial
behavior.1 66
If punishment creates a greater net secular good,
punishment is just (even, some would argue, if the person being punished
is innocent); if punishment does not create a greater net good for society,
even the guilty should go free.' 67 Each of these theories--deterrence,
68
incapacitation, and rehabilitation-will be discussed below. 1
a.

Deterrence

Deterrence can be defined as refraining from an action because of the
perceived negative possible consequences of the action. 169 Deterrence
theorists argue that punishment is justified to the extent that it prevents
future crime. While punishment may be an evil, good accrues through
the prevention or reduction of the greater evil of crime.' 70 Deterrence
"justifies penal coercion on the assumption that it contributes to order
and stability in society by enforcing compliance with norms embodied in
criminal law.' 17 1 In the short-term, order is maintained by maximizing
the effectiveness of punishment for potential criminals; in the long-term,
punishment molds the behavior of, and reinforces morality for, future

164. H. Rashdall, Punishment and the Individual, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
PUNISHMENT, supra note 148, at 64, 65.
165. PACKER, supra note 139, at 11.

166. Id.
167. MOORE, supra note 141, at 37.
168. Some have argued that two of these theories-general deterrence and incapacitation-are
merely rationalizations for retribution. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 139, at 58. Packer
suggests that it is possible that all justifications for punishment are in truth fueled by vengeance.
PACKER, supra note 139, at 59-60.
169. WALKER, supra note 139, at 13.

170. PACKER, supra note 139, at 39.
171. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 139, at 49.
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generations. 172 "[C]rime is prevented by the threat of unpleasant
consequences"; the threat is reinforced by the punishment of those who
commit crimes.1 73 Those consequences need not necessarily be physical;
of punishment may be
the threat of shame or social disgrace as a result
74
law.1
the
with
compliance
coerce
to
sufficient
Jeremy Bentham explains that punishment, for deterrence theorists,
has four objects: to prevent all offenses; to prevent the worst offenses, if
offending is inevitable; to limit the offender to as little harm as possible;
and to prevent that harm as cheaply as possible. 175 Bentham's model
assumes a perfectly hedonistic, perfectly rational actor whose object it
is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. To such an actor
contemplating the possibility of a criminal act the decision is based on
a calculus: How much do I stand to gain by doing it? How much do I
stand to lose if I am caught doing it? What are the chances of my
getting away with it? What is the balance of gain and loss as
discounted by the chance of apprehension? The purpose of criminal
punishment, on this model, is to inject into the calculus a sufficient
prospect of loss or pain to reduce to zero the attractiveness of the
possible gain.176
Deterrence theory can be divided into two strains: special and
general. Special deterrence theory argues that punishment is intended to
prevent a person who has been punished from committing similar
offenses in the future. 177 "Once subjected to the pain of punishment...
the individual is conditioned to avoid in the future conduct that he knows
178
is likely to result again in the infliction of pain through punishment."'
General deterrence, in contrast, "is not concerned with the effects of
punishment upon the subsequent career of someone who has been
punished. It concentrates instead upon the efficacy of the threat of
crime." 179
punishment upon those who are disposed to or tempted by
Punishment deters would-be offenders by showing them, through the

172. Id. at 49, 58.
173. Id. at 51.
174. PACKER, supranote 139, at 42-43.
175.

JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

178 (Clarendon Press 1907) (1789).
176. PACKER, supranote 139, at 40-41.
177. See TEN, supra note 144, at 7 ("Punishment deters the offender who is punished from
committing similar offenses in the future .....
178. PACKER, supranote 139, at 45.
179. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 139, at 55.
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examples of others who have been punished,
what they can expect to
80
experience if they choose to do wrong.'
Punishment only acts as a deterrent when consistently applied,
however. 181 "A penal system that hopes to deter crime cannot tolerate
exceptions.' 8 2 If no punishment is meted out, "the deterrent effect of
punishment breaks down, and subsequent punishments are wasted, as
they inflict pain for no compensating return-a cruelty that cannot be
justified."'' 8 3 Accordingly, "a legal system should not make exceptions to
rules. Thus, the rules themselves184must be humane, but the enforcement
of those rules must be absolute."'
At least one prominent retributivist scholar has come to believe that
deterrence may provide a stronger justification for punishment than
retribution. If moral theory is understood in the political context of the
state, the state's goals for punishment should be paramount. And in the
area of punishment, the state's overriding concern is with preventing
future crime, not in addressing crime that has already occurred. Given
that context, deterrence is arguably a more appropriate justification for
punishment than retribution. 185 Scholars have questioned whether as a
practical 186
matter, however, punishment actually serves this deterrent
function.
b. Incapacitation
"In a society that was single-mindedly devoted to the repression of
crime as a paramount objective of social life, incapacitation would be the
most immediately plausible utilitarian justification for the punishment of
offenders."' 87 Under this theory, punishment is justified because the
incarceration of the offender prevents that person from committing
further acts of harm, thus increasing the good to society. 188 "To the hard180.
181.
laws are
182.
183.

TEN, supra note 144, at 7.
See RADZtNOWICZ, supra note 140, at 122 (arguing that general deterrence is unlikely if
not adequately enforced).
MOORE, supranote 141, at 38.
Id.

184. Id.at 39.
185.

MURPHY, supra note 144, at 24.

186. See TEN, supra note 144, at 8 (arguing that there is no evidence that punishment deters
individuals). See generally Johannes Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 76
(1968) (stating that it seems a majority of offenders react positively to punishment but there is a
group of offenders who are not deterred).
187.

PACKER, supra note 139, at 48.

188. See id. (contending that in a society concerned exclusively with repressing crime,
incapacitation would be the most preferred justification).
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headed man in the street the utilitarian justification seems obvious. The
longer a murderer, rapist, child-molester, or armed robber is detained the
fewer the people he will victimize in the future: hopefully none."' 189 That
the criminal may not be either deterred or rehabilitated is immaterial to
those justifying punishment on the theory of incapacitation; the benefits
stem solely from the offender's inability to reoffend while "out of
general social circulation."'1 90
Incapacitation justifications rest on
predictions that those who have committed crimes in the past are likely
to commit additional crimes (of the same or different kinds) in the
future.' 91 The "fact that a person has committed a crime ...[serves] as
[a] basis for assessing [that person's] personality and" forecasting
the
192
strong likelihood that the person will reoffend in some way.
c.

Rehabilitation

"The most immediately appealing justification for punishment is the
claim that it may be used to prevent crime by so changing the personality
of the offender that he will conform to the dictates of law.... ."19' In the

first half of the twentieth century, philosophers and reformers turned
away from the idea of punishment as payback and looked to the
94
behavioral sciences to remake offenders "into law-abiding citizens."',
Rehabilitation inures to the benefit of both the criminal-"'in order to
afford the means of amendment and to lead the transgressor to
repentance, and to mercy' ,195-and society. Rehabilitation treats each
offender "as an individual whose special needs and problems must be"
understood in order to effectuate positive change in that individual and
must begin with an assessment of the offender's amenability to
treatment. 196 Rehabilitation can include inducement of repentance,
recognition of moral guilt, and development of awareness of the
demands of society via vocational training and psychological
treatment. 197 The intensity and duration of punishment depends upon the
189. WALKER, supra note 139, at 38.
190. TEN, supra note 144, at 8. While Ten acknowledges that there are opportunities to commit
crimes while in prison, he contends that "[those] opportunities are generally reduced." Id.
191. PACKER, supra note 139, at 49.
192. Id.
193. Id.at 53.
194. MOORE, supra note 141, at 57.
195. Frances A. Allen, The Rehabilitative Ideal, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS,
EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 158, at 209, 210 (quoting GEORGE W. DALZELL,
BENEFIT OF CLERGY AND RELATED MATrERS 13 (1955)).

196. PACKER, supra note 139, at 54.
197. HART, supra note 139, at 26.
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amount of effort needed to change the offender's personality.,9 8 The
offender is deemed rehabilitated when his values have changed
sufficiently "that he will not commit similar199offences in the future
because he believes such offences to be wrong."'
Some proponents of rehabilitation measured the reformation of
female offenders differently than that of men. William I. Thomas
believed that criminal behavior in women was linked to their desire to
experience the same kind of excitement as men.200 These "women who
were unadjusted .. .that is, women who wished for 'freedom in the
larger world'-were to be detained for indeterminate periods 20and
psychologically adjusted to their original 'interest in human babies."' '
Rehabilitation was touted as a superior approach to criminal justice,
improving the individual offender rather than inflicting the pain of
punishment. "[W]hat could be more humane, more civilized, more
sensible and more benevolent than directing society's efforts solely
toward the end of achieving the rehabilitation or cure of that social misfit
who breaks the law?, 20 2 Rehabilitation offered a number of benefits:
saving the offender, protecting society by imprisoning the offender until
the offender reformed, and "reduc[ing] the crime rate not only by using
cure-or-detention to eliminate recidivism, but hopefully also by the
identification of potential criminals in advance so that they can be
rendered harmless by preventive treatment. ' 20 3
Proponents of
rehabilitation stressed that they were not excusing the offender's
behavior but directing society's resources in the manner most likely to
result in the prevention of further criminal activity.20 4
Rehabilitation has its critics as well. Although proponents ask "how
the reformatory view of punishment can be accused of disrespect for
human personality," 20 5 critics argue that there is a legitimate moral
question about whether society has a right to fundamentally change an
offender's personality in order to compel him to become good, as well 2as
06
a practical question about whether we know how to achieve that result.
Rehabilitation, however well intended, still views the individual as
198. PACKER, supra note 139, at 54.
199. TEN, supra note 144, at 7-8.
200. JONES, supra note 94, at 7.
201. Id.
202. Richard Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
PUNISHMENT, supra note 148, at 328, 328.
203. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 139, at 37.
204. Wasserstrom, supra note 202, at 334.
205. Rashdall, supra note 164, at 65.
206. PACKER, supra note 139, at 55-58.
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subordinate to society to the extent that the individual does not produce
good for society. As Herbert Packer notes:
However benevolent the purpose of reform, however better off we
expect its object to be, there is no blinking the fact that what we do to
the offender in the name of reform is being done to him by compulsion
and for our sake, not for his. Rehabilitation may be the most humane
goal of punishment, but it is a goal of punishment so long as its
invocation depends upon finding that an offense has been committed,
20 7
and so long as its object is to prevent the commission of offenses.
Others argue that rehabilitation undermines the general deterrent
effect of punishment, subordinating the prevention of a first offense to
the prevention of a future one by the same actor.20 s Rehabilitation is also
particularly susceptible to misuse. Because the length of sentence is tied
directly to the time needed to reform the offender, individuals who were
not declared "cured" languished for years in prisons, serving terms far
exceeding what society now deems appropriate for those crimes. 209
Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jules L. Coleman argue that rehabilitation no
longer has any credence as a justification for punishment. They contend
that a therapeutic regime can in fact be more harmful to the individual
than imprisonment and can deny the individual due process.
Additionally, they argue that psychiatrists are no more able than others to
determine an individual's future dangerousness. Finally, they believe
that treating a criminal as sick denies both the moral seriousness of the
person's crimes as well as the personhood of the criminal.210
B. Applying Theories of Punishment in State v. Shanahan

Criminal punishment generally is justified under one or more of the
four theories of punishment discussed above. But what happens when
those theories are applied to an individual case-for instance, to the case
of Dixie Shanahan?

207. Id. at 53-54.
208. HART, supra note 139, at 26-27.
209, See MOORE, supra note 141, at 66-72 (discussing the failures, injustices, and decline of the
rehabilitation model).
210. MURPHY &COLEMAN, supra note 138, at 137-38.
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1. Retribution
The retributivist argument for punishing Dixie Shanahan might take
the following forms: (1) criminal punishment is Dixie Shanahan's just
desert for killing her husband; (2) punishing Dixie Shanahan equalizes
the moral balance upset by her actions; (3) punishing Dixie Shanahan
removes the unfair advantage she obtained by killing her husband.
First, consider the notion of just deserts in the context of this case.
Historically, the idea of just desert was tied to the belief that the
punishment should in some sense be proportionate to the crime; the lex
talionis measure of an eye for an eye. 211 Jeffrie G. Murphy asks, "[W]hat
does it mean to say that a person deserves a certain level of suffering as
punishment? ' 2 12 For battered women who kill, what does it mean to
deserve punishment when the victim of the ultimate crime has inflicted
immeasurable damage on the person who finally kills him? Although
Scott Shanahan never quite managed to kill Dixie, he certainly inflicted a
great deal of injury, pain, anguish, and humiliation on her until just
before the moment he died. Is it not fair to factor the suffering that Dixie
Shanahan endured for nineteen years into the calculus of just deserts?
Imagine a ledger in which Scott Shanahan's many crimes against his
wife were tallied. Looking at all of the offenses for which Scott
Shanahan was never punished (outside of six days in jail, which only led
him to redouble his attacks on his wife), Dixie Shanahan's actions may
have simply brought them to even on that balance sheet. For Dixie
Shanahan's deserts to be just, her punishment should have been
proportionate to her crime-the murder of an extremely abusive husband
after a horrific episode of battering-not to the generic crime of seconddegree murder. A just punishment would have taken into account the
years of abuse she endured, the abuse she faced over those two days in
August, the danger posed to her and her unborn child, and her subjective
belief that she would be killed before the end of that day. 213 Because her
211.
212.

See supra text accompanying note 142.
MURPHY, supra note 144, at 22.

213. North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Harry Martin made a similar argument in dissent in
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). In considering Norman's self-defense claim, Martin
stated,

By his barbaric conduct over the course of twenty years, J.T. Norman reduced the quality
of the defendant's life to such an abysmal state that, given the opportunity to do so, the

jury might well have found that she was justified in acting in self-defense for the
preservation of her tragic life.
Id. at 21 (Martin, J., dissenting).

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

punishment was divorced from the context in which her actions took
place, she did not receive her just deserts.
Linked to the idea of just deserts is the belief that punishment
equalizes the moral balance disturbed by the commission of a crime.
Should an action still be punishable, though, when that action in some
way restores the moral balance between the parties? Scott Shanahan's
continual abuse of his wife surely placed him in moral debt to her. Scott
Shanahan never repaid that moral debt; the six days that he spent in jail
over a nineteen-year reign of terror hardly equalized the moral balance.
Rather than upsetting the moral balance, Dixie Shanahan's act arguably
restored some of the dignity and agency stolen from her as a result of
years of abuse by her husband, and allowed her to escape from what
promised to be many more years of abuse, had he not killed her sooner.
Moralistic retributivists believe that people deserve punishment
when, by their crimes, they show themselves to be morally reprehensible;
simply put, "[i]t is good when bad things happen to bad people. '21 4 Even
accepting the prosecution's version of events, in which Dixie Shanahan
shot her husband while he lay in bed during a lull in two days of abusing
her, it is difficult to see how her crime renders her morally reprehensible.
By all accounts, Dixie Shanahan was not a bad person, a morally
reprehensible person. Witness after witness for both the prosecution and
defense described her as a good mother, a person who cared for others
both professionally and personally, and who endured year after year of
horrific abuse in part because of her love for the mother of her abuser
and in part because she continued to hope that Scott Shanahan could be a
good husband and father. She had never been in trouble previously. She
finally acted to save her own life and that of her unborn child. 215 When a
person is not wicked-for example, acting under duress-that person is
not deserving of punishment.2 16
Dixie Shanahan's actions were
unlawful, but she acted out of desperation, not wickedness. From a
moralistic retributivist perspective, Dixie Shanahan did not deserve to be
punished.
Did Dixie Shanahan derive some unfair advantage from her crime?
Was she able to enjoy some greater liberty than others as a result of
killing her husband?
If so, legalistic retributivists would argue,
214. MOORE, supra note 141, at 94, 108-09.
215. The prosecution introduced evidence about a bank account that Dixie Shanahan continued
to draw on after Scott's death by forging his name on checks, apparently to establish a financial
motive for the crime. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 505-14. Though worse crimes have been
committed for smaller sums of money, it is hard to believe that money was Dixie Shanahan's real
motive, and the prosecution did not make much of this theory in its closing argument.
216. MOORE, supra note 141, at 113.

2007]

THE PUNISHMENT OF DIXIE SHANAHAN

punishing her is just. So what did Dixie Shanahan actually get as a result
of her crime? Freedom from abuse. The ability to carry her unborn child
to term. Safety for herself and her children. All of the benefits that
Dixie Shanahan derived from her crime are taken for granted by most
individuals in a free society. Legalistic retributivists believe that if a
crime allows the actor to enjoy a wider liberty than others, punishment is
justified to rectify that unearned advantage.2 17 But what if the crime
simply restores the actor to the same state of liberty that others in the
community enjoy? Scott Shanahan had deprived his wife of rights that
most people probably never consciously consider-the right to dignity,
the right to bodily integrity, the right to be free from violence. 21" Killing
him gave her no benefit not enjoyed by her neighbors. Dixie Shanahan
killed to restore herself to the state in which members of her community
routinely lived, free from fear and abuse. Achieving such parity can
hardly be called an unfair advantage.
2. Utilitarian Justifications
Utilitarians would argue that Dixie Shanahan's punishment was just
if punishing her created a greater societal good than refraining from
punishment.
Viewed through the specific lenses of deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, it is hard to see how punishing Dixie
Shanahan serves the greater good.
a.

Deterrence

Justifying Dixie Shanahan's punishment using deterrence theories
raises two questions. Will the punishment prevent her from killing
again? Will the punishment prevent others like her from killing?
Because the answer to both of those questions is no, the punishment
cannot be just.

217.

Id. at 102.

218. Such rights are guaranteed by international human rights declarations and laws including
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women as well as by United States law. See generally CARRIE CUTHBERT ET AL.,
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD
CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS (2002) (discussing human ights violations

against battered women and children).
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Special Deterrence

One function of punishment, according to deterrence theorists, is to
prevent the individual being punished from reoffending by showing that
person that her wrongful actions will result in some form of deprivation.
But if the offender is particularly unlikely either to recidivate or to be
deterred because of the situation in which she finds herself, special
deterrence is a weak justification for punishment.
Some believe that battered women are recidivists-that is, they tend
to move from abusive relationship to abusive relationship. If this were
true, a greater likelihood would exist that a battered woman who had
killed her abuser would find herself in a position where she might kill
again and punishment that deterred her from engaging in that behavior
might be justified. But there is no empirical evidence to support the
claim that battered women engage in serial abusive relationships, 21 9 and
there is no evidence that battered women who kill are likely to kill
.220
again.
Most battered women who kill, like Dixie Shanahan, have
never been in trouble before. As Jean Harris noted,
It is one of the many ironies of this prison that many of the women
with the longest terms are the least dangerous, and led the most useful
lives before coming here. . . They were good daughters, good wives,

good mothers and good citizens until the day or night the final straw of
cruelty was piled on top of all the other straws ....
Because battered women who kill are unlikely to be in a position to or be
inclined to kill again, deterrence does not justify their punishment.
Legal philosophers have explored whether there are situations in
which individuals will not be deterred by the threat of punishment. Nigel
Walker contends that fear can make "normally law-abiding men and
women become temporarily undeterrable and do things whose
consequences would usually deter them. 22 Walker further argues that
223
homicides are "usually committed in undeterrable states of mind.
Herbert Packer adds that "[d]eterrence does not threaten those whose lot
219. WALKER, supra note 93, at 7.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95 (stating that battered women do not want to kill
and will not do it if they do not absolutely have to).
221.

JEAN HARRIS, "THEY ALWAYS CALL US LADIES": STORIES FROM PRISON 219 (1988).

222. WALKER, supra note 139, at 14. Battered women kill out of fear rather than anger,
although most battered women eventually feel anger toward their abusers. "If every battered woman
who was angry were to kill her batterer, there'd be a lot more dead men around." WALKER, supra
note 93, at 201.
223. WALKER, supra note 139, at 16.
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in life is already miserable beyond the point of hope.', 22 4 Dixie
Shanahan's actions are consistent with these arguments.
In her
testimony, she described the fear that she felt for both herself and her
unborn child, fear springing from the absolute certainty that she and the
fetus would be dead by the end of the day, as her husband promised.2 25
She also described the relentless abuse, injury, and humiliation she
suffered,2 26 an existence that would surely create the kind of
hopelessness contemplated by Packer.
Before killing her husband, Dixie Shanahan was not thinking about
the punishment she might endure for killing her husband; she was
thinking about the punishment he would surely mete out if she took no
action. Only afterwards did Dixie Shanahan realize that she was going to
go to jail "[b]ecause I had just shot somebody. 22 7
Consider again the four questions Bentham posited that individuals
ask when they consider committing a crime: "How much do I stand to
gain by doing it? How much do I stand to lose if I am caught doing it?
What are my chances of my getting away with it? What is the balance of
gain and loss as discounted by the chance of apprehension?" 228 Bentham
believed that punishment operates to "reduce ...the attractiveness of the

possible gain" by "inject[ing] into the calculus a sufficient prospect of
loss or pain." 229 This model assumes an offender with the time, clarity of
mind, and access to other options to make such a calculation. Dixie
Shanahan never considered these questions, because the immediacy and
dangerousness of her situation did not permit her to do so. 230 The threat
of punishment did not deter her from shooting Scott Shanahan and would
not, in the extremely unlikely event that she found herself facing a
similar situation, deter her in the future.

224. PACKER, supra note 139, at 45.
225. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 489-90.
226. Id.at 443-89.
227. Id.at 490.
228. See supratext accompanying note 176.
229. PACKER, supra note 139, at 41.
230. Some might argue that the jury rejected Dixie Shanahan's belief that she was in imminent
danger of harm by finding that her actions were neither justified nor excused. But the failure to
establish the elements of the legal claims of justification and/or excuse does not foreclose
consideration of those beliefs; making a philosophical argument about the propriety of punishment is
fundamentally different than establishing a legal claim. While the lull between the last beating and
the shooting might have convinced the jury that the legal claims of justification and/or excuse were
not available to Dixie Shanahan, that lull did not convince Dixie Shanahan that her life and the life
of her unborn child were not in danger-the relevant standard in considering her claim on the justice
of punishment.
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ii. General Deterrence
"Open a loophole for one woman to kill an abusive spouse and pretty
soon you've got dozens of dead husbands., 23' This statement, made by
an Iowa newspaper columnist shortly after Dixie Shanahan's sentencing,
captures the general deterrence rationale for punishing battered women
who kill. The theory of general deterrence is grounded in the assumption
that potential offenders are deterred from committing crimes by their
awareness of the punishment that others have received for committing
the same offenses.2 32 Jurors relied on that rationale to convict Elaine
Mullis, a battered woman who killed her husband with a four-inch paring
knife as he choked and mauled her while she prepared dinner. 233 After
the trial, one juror explained the verdict: "We couldn't let her go .... It
would have been open season on husbands in Atkinson County. 2 34
Elaine Mullis was sentenced to life in prison.2 35
The idea that all women-not just battered women-will begin
indiscriminately killing their husbands if battered women who kill are
not punished drives the justification for punishing women like Dixie

231. David Yepsen, Op-Ed., Let Shanahan Case Run Course, DES MOINES REG., May 16, 2004,
at 3 OP; see also JONES, supra note 94, at 289-90 (quoting a neighbor of Francine Hughes who had
once pulled her husband off of her when he was beating her in the yard, stating, "If she gets out of
this.., there'll be a lot of dead guys lying around.").
232. For punishment to have a deterrent effect, the fear of punishment must be greater than the
sacrifice involved in refraining from the offense. Andenaes, supranote 186, at 79 ("If we make the
risk of punishment sufficient to outweigh the prospect of the gain, the potential lawbreaker will, as a
rational man, choose to stay within the limits of the law."). But what if the punishment actually
provides a respite from the conditions that lead to the crime? One woman serving life in prison for
killing her batterer stated, "It's better than the hell I lived with .... There are rules here, every day's
predictable. I don't worry anymore about doing something wrong to make him angry. You can't
imagine what a relief that is. I feel better now. At least I know what to expect." WALKER, supra
note 93, at 224.
233.

JONES, supra note 94, at 324. Elaine Mullis was using the paring knife to prepare dinner

when her husband attacked her. The wound in his chest caused by the knife needed only four
stitches, but because the blade struck an artery and the medical care her husband received was
"delayed and inadequate," Connie Mullis died. Id.
234. Id; see also id. at 290 (citing a 1978 NEWSWEEK article, Wives Who Batter Back, in which
the author worried that if battered women were not punished for killing their abusers, such "frontier
justice" would create "a new legitimacy for violent retaliation"). Jones notes that the media created
the impression that women were routinely murdering their husbands and getting away with it by
reporting only the acquittals. Id. at 292. In fact, the work done by battered women's advocates to
increase resources and options for battered women has actually saved the lives of a number of men;
"from 1976 through 1987 the number of women killing male partners decreased by twenty-five
percent." Id. at 346; see also Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Exploring the Effect of Resource
Availability and the Likelihood of Female-PerpetratedHomicides, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 75, 91
(1989) (explaining that states with better legislation and resources had lower rates of homicides by
women against their male partners).
235. JONES, supra note 94, at 324.
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Shanahan. But just as it is doubtful that Dixie Shanahan would have
been deterred from her crime, it is also doubtful that other women in the
same position would be deterred by knowing that she was punished.
Deterrent effects have been linked to a number of variables, including
"the type of crime, . . . the incentive to commit the crime, the severity of
the threatened punishment and the extent to which the penalty is known
2 36
[to the offender], and the likelihood of being caught and punished.
Legal philosophers believe that some crimes cannot be deterred,
regardless of the severity of the penalty.237
Deterrence assumes that the potential offender has options other than
committing the crime and can therefore make a reasoned choice not to
offend. But the context in which battered women make decisions about
offending is often one in which no other options are available. For
battered women who kill, the incentive is often to save their own lives or
the lives of their children, and though they may be aware of the penalties,
they often believe that no other option is available to them, particularly
because most kill after "numerous other efforts to fight back, escape, or
appease the abuser [have] failed., 238 Battered women are frequently
isolated from both formal and informal sources of help-the legal
system, shelters, clergy, family, and friends. 239 Even if the woman is
able to reach out, services may be inaccessible for any number of
reasons, including location, language, or culture. Further, although
services that purport to stop the violence may be available, they might
not be particularly effective. Battered women who ultimately kill are
aware of the stories of women who have done everything "right"-called
the police, sought protective orders, cooperated with prosecutors-only
to be horribly abused or killed by their attackers.24 ° Which is likely to
have a greater effect-seeing battered women who kill go to prison, or
236. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supranote 139, at 56.
237. See id at 58 ("There is a class of offenders whose crimes cannot be prevented no matter
how harsh the threatened penalty."). This argument assumes, of course, that deterrence works to
prevent some crimes, a claim which has been hotly disputed in the literature. See Andenaes, supra
note 186, at 79, 92-93 (stating extreme positions appear from the literature and concluding that "the
majority of offenders react positively to punishment but that there remains a hard core of offenders
who are neither reformed nor deterred").
238.

GAGNt, supra note 18, at 176.

239. See id. at 19 ("Abusers often attempt to control and isolate victims in an effort to guard the
secret of abuse and because of their jealousy of any attention their partners may give or receive from
family, friends, or coworkers.").
240. See, e.g., Cuniberti, supra note 98 (reporting how her husband shot Kelli Alexander after
Kelli called the police, left her husband, and obtained a restraining order); see also Moore v. Green,
848 N.E.2d 1015, 1018-27 (I11.2006) (denying immunity to police officers who responded to 911
call from victim who had an emergency protective order by driving to her home but failing to enter
and investigate; five minutes after the police left, she was killed by her abuser).
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seeing women who have done all the system asked of them harmed, even
killed, despite their best attempts to flee? 24 1 The lack of meaningful
alternatives for battered women whose situations have grown so dire that
they believe they must kill or be killed impairs their ability to be
deterred.
Deterrence is also grounded in the idea that the potential offender
will assess her own position relative to the experiences of others like her.
But the experience of being battered is not necessarily generalizable. In
the midst of a battering incident, the victim is thinking only about the
unique circumstances of her situation, assessing the lethality of her
attacker and the likelihood that she or someone close to her will be
killed. It is unlikely that battered women assimilating their perceptions
of imminent death stop to think, "Dixie Shanahan killed her husband and
was sentenced to fifty years of imprisonment. My situation is like hers.
I am likely to be sentenced similarly. Therefore, I should find another
solution-before he kills me." Arguably, the deterrent effect could
operate at an earlier moment in the relationship, spurring the woman to
leave or seek other assistance with her abuser. That argument assumes
that the decision to kill is made at that earlier point; studies of battered
women who kill suggest, however, that these decisions are situational,
made in the midst of a battering incident.242 Thinking about how she will
not be there to raise her children is not likely to deter the battered woman
who kills if she is certain that she or that child is about to die.
Killing her abuser is the battered woman's only recourse in an
untenable situation. She believes she must kill or be killed. Knowing
that Dixie Shanahan has been punished will not deter her from saving her
own life.243 General deterrence is not an adequate rationale for punishing
Dixie Shanahan.
241. Deterrence theorists have noted that general deterrence is unlikely if enforcement of the law
is inadequate. See RADZINOWICZ, supra note 140, at 122 ("Neither fear of punishment nor respect
for the law is likely to hold back potential offenders effectively if [enforcement of the law] is known
to be inadequate."). Given the uneven enforcement of laws meant to protect battered women,
batterers are arguably not being deterred at all. The criminal system is far more efficient at
convicting and punishing battered women who fight back against their abusers. See BROWNE, supra
note 31, at II ("FBI statistics indicate that fewer men are charged with first- or second-degree
murder for killing a woman they have known than are women who kill a man they have known.");
see also MEG CRAGER ET AL., KING COUNTY COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, VICTIMDEFENDANTS: AN EMERGING CHALLENGE IN RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SEATTLE

AND THE KING COUNTY REGION 16 (2003) ("[T]he information available suggests that there is a
significant and increasing number of domestic violence survivors being arrested and/or charged with
domestic violence-related crimes in the King County region.").
242. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
243. Of course, to the extent that she is proven correct when she is killed, it is impossible to
know whether a dead battered woman was deterred by the thought of punishment.

2007]

THE PUNISHMENT OF DIXIE SHANAHAN

b. Incapacitation
Punishing Dixie Shanahan certainly means that she will be kept out
of society. The relevant question is whether keeping her out of society
either protects society or promotes societal good, as required by
utilitarianism.
Justifying punishment through incapacitation assumes that because
an individual has offended in the past, she is likely to commit additional
crimes; the community, therefore, will be safer if the individual is
removed from society.244 If the offender is unlikely to recidivate,
however, the justification fails. Murderers have very low rates of
recidivism, 245 and, as discussed above, battered women who kill have
rarely engaged in criminal activity previously and are highly unlikely to
commit future crimes.246 While incapacitating Dixie Shanahan will
certainly keep her out of society, it is doubtful that doing so prevents
future crime.
A more interesting question is whether the greater good accrues to
society as a result of punishing Dixie Shanahan. By all accounts, Ms.
Shanahan was a productive member of her community. She provided
care not only for her three children and for her husband's parents until
their deaths, but also for the sick and elderly patients residing in the
247
nursing homes where she worked throughout her marriage.
Proponents of incapacitation would argue that society benefits because
Ms. Shanahan is not free to commit other crimes. But the likelihood of
Ms. Shanahan's reoffending is low and must be balanced against a
number of other costs to society created by incapacitating her. Instead of
having Ms. Shanahan contribute to the community's tax base, the state
will bear the costs of her incarceration for at least the next thirty-five
years. Ms. Shanahan's children lose their mother, the only stable figure
in their lives. Experts believe that severing the bonds between children
exposed to domestic violence and their abused parents can have
profoundly negative consequences for those children.24 8 Ms. Shanahan's
244. PACKER, supra note 139, at 49.
245. Id. at 52-53.
246. Battered women who kill are unlikely to recidivate not just because they avoid future
abusive relationships, but because they may avoid relationships altogether. As Joyce DeVillez, who
hired a hit man to kill her husband after twenty-three years of abuse, noted, "If I ever get out of here,
... I'll never have a man around the house again." JONES, supra note 94, at 323-24.
247. Transcript of Trial, supra note 3, at 449.
248. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 197-200 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reviewing the
testimony of a number of experts on the impact of domestic violence on children, including Dr. Evan
Stark, Dr. Jeffrey Edleson, Dr. David Pelcovitz, Dr. Peter Wolf, and Betsy McAlister Groves). For a
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new husband, friends, neighbors, coworkers, and community are all
deprived of the positive contributions she made to their lives on a daily
basis. Ms. Shanahan's elderly and disabled patients no longer receive
the high quality of care she provided them. Juxtaposing all of these
losses to the community against the low risk of further criminal behavior,
it is hard to see the utilitarian justification for incapacitation in this case.
c.

Rehabilitation

Will punishment rehabilitate Dixie Shanahan?
That question
assumes that Ms. Shanahan is somehow in need of rehabilitation, an
assumption based on the notion of criminals as diseased rather than
depraved. While the rehabilitation justification for punishment has fallen
out of vogue in recent years, legal doctrines developed specifically to
protect battered women could, in fact, inadvertently provide support for
the idea that battered women need rehabilitation.
Recognizing that the failure of courts to admit evidence of battering
prevented them from presenting persuasive self-defense cases, advocates
for battered women fought to have this evidence admitted in the trials of
battered women who killed. 249 Experts were permitted to testify to the
effects battering has on women and how that battering created the
context for the actions taken by battered women who killed. 250 This
evidence on the effects of domestic violence has come to be known as
"battered woman syndrome., 251 As Elizabeth Schneider notes, "Because
the term is frequently used as shorthand for 'evidence of a battering
relationship' by judges, legislators, and legal scholars, it is not clear in
any particular context what it refers to. '252 What it suggests, however, is
that all battered women suffer from some disease or syndrome which can
be cured. Schneider argues that "because 'battered woman syndrome'
sounds like a form of mental disease or defect, lawyers relying on this
framework are more likely to view the case through the lens of an
impaired mental state., 253 The term "implies that [the battered woman]
is limited because of her weakness and her problems." 254 Judges and
discussion of the impact of parental incarceration on children, see generally Elizabeth I. Johnson,
Youth with IncarceratedParents:An Introduction to the Issues, PREVENTION RESEARCHER, Apr.
2006, at 3.
249. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 119 (2000).

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id. at 124.
254. Id. at 135.

Battered woman syndrome has also been criticized for inappropriately
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juries hearing such evidence may make similar assumptions, triggering
the rehabilitation justification for punishment: punishment is appropriate
in these cases because the battered woman suffers from a condition that
must be cured before she can safely resume her place in society.
The problem with this rationale, of course, is that the term "battered
woman syndrome" has been horribly misconstrued. While some battered
women are mentally ill, 255 the condition of being battered does not, in
and of itself, constitute a mental illness or defect.256 A battered woman
who kills cannot be cured of being a battered woman through
punishment-nor does she need to be.
Rehabilitation also assumes that the criminal cannot or does not
recognize the wrongfulness of her actions. 257 But most battered women
who kill regret the killings and recognize their own legal guilt. 258 They
do ask, however, that these killings be considered in the context of the
violence that they suffered. 259 As one woman explained,
I'm not asking to be found not guilty, because I am guilty, I took his
life, I did it. But, there were extenuating circumstances, and they
should take that into consideration, you know. .

.

. I am definitely

guilty of taking his life, I mean, if I was found not guilty, they'd have
to look for who did it, right, I mean, someone's got to be guilty. And I
certainly take responsibility for what I did, I have26no problem with that,
but I certainly don't deserve 18 to 20 years for it. 0
C.L. Ten explains that offenders are rehabilitated to the extent that
they will not commit similar offenses in the future because their values
have changed and they now believe such offenses are wrong. 261 Most
battered women who kill already have this understanding, but if faced
reinforcing stereotypes of battered women as passive victims. This characterization is particularly
problematic for battered women who kill because "it fails to account for why they eventually acted.
Jurors are presented with a description of the battered woman who is helpless and submissive. Any
woman who deviates from the model, who seeks help or defends her own life may be seen as
abnormal or unreasonable." BUSCH, supra note 95, at 40.
255. See generally CAROLE WARSHAW & HOLLY BARNES, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE &
MENTAL HEALTH POLICY INITIATIVE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MENTAL HEALTH & TRAUMA:
RESEARCH
HIGHLIGHTS,
available at
http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/

otherpubs/MentalHealthResearch.pdf (surveying research regarding the correlation between
domestic violence and mental health).
256. Kinports, supra note 3, at 170.
257. See supra text accompanying note 199 (stating that an offender is rehabilitated when he
believes his offenses to be wrong).
258. See, e.g., BUSCH, supra note 95, at 66 (describing the feelings of a woman convicted for
murdering her husband).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. TEN, supra note 144, at 7-8.
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with the same situation would likely make the same decision, believing
that they had no other choice. As Dixie Shanahan explained shortly after
her sentencing, "If I was in the same circumstances, would I do it again?
Yes I would ... knowing what it cost me and my children., 262 These
women need no change in values-only a change in the circumstances
that created a situation that led them to kill.
Neither retributive nor utilitarian theories of justice justify the
punishment Dixie Shanahan received for killing her husband. The
utilitarian theories, as discussed above, cannot be justly applied to the
case of Dixie Shanahan, or indeed, to the cases of most battered women
who kill. Punishment could be justified under a retributivist theory, but
only to the extent that Dixie Shanahan received her just deserts. Because
the punishment was not imposed with an eye toward the abuse she had
suffered or the context for her actions, the punishment of Dixie Shanahan
was not just.
What precludes Dixie Shanahan and other battered women who kill
from receiving their just deserts? Three factors spur the unjust sentences
in these cases: mandatory minimum sentence requirements, judicial
unwillingness to consider context, and concerns about the failure to
punish these women harshly.
V. JUSTICE DENIED: WHY BATTERED WOMEN RECEIVE UNJUST
PUNISHMENTS

A. Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Conceding that Dixie Shanahan was guilty of second-degree murder,
retributivist theories justify some kind of punishment.
But her
sentence-fifty years to life, with a minimum term of imprisonment of
thirty-five years-was not justified. This inequity is a result of the
mandatory minimum sentence Judge Smith was required to impose in her
case. Mandatory minimum sentences preclude judges from ordering
appropriate punishment when punishment is due. The inability to
exercise discretion in sentencing defeated the just application of the
theories of criminal punishment in the case of Dixie Shanahan.

262. Staci Hupp, Shanahan Says She Would Do It Again, DES MoiNEs REG., May 13, 2004, at
IA.
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1. Mandatory Minimums in Iowa
The mandatory minimum sentence in Iowa for second-degree murder
is fifty years of imprisonment.2 63 An offender must serve at least seventy
264
percent of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole.
Mandatory minimum sentences in Iowa have withstood constitutional
equal protection of the law or amount
challenges that the sentences deny
265
to cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Women and Mandatory Minimums
Mandatory minimum sentences remove judicial discretion from
sentencing determinations, ensuring that every person convicted of a
particular crime serves the same amount of time for the offense.266 One
goal of these sentencing reforms was to create gender equality in
sentencing. 267 For women, however, the move to mandatory minimum
sentences has been particularly problematic, for judges are no longer able
to consider the contexts in which these women's crimes take place. In
cases involving drug crimes, that has meant that women who were
marginally involved in the drug trade because of their relationships with
high-level drug dealers have been sentenced to long prison terms-in
some cases, terms longer than those received by their much more
culpable mates.268 Courts have been unable to weigh the nature of the
263. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.3,907.11 (West 2003).
264. IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.12 (West Supp. 2006). Until 2003, Iowa law required an offender
to serve eighty-five percent of her sentence prior to becoming eligible for parole. In Dixie
Shanahan's case, that means a seven-year difference in the length of her sentence. The old Iowa law
was strongly influenced by requirements placed on funding available to the states through the federal
Violent Offender Incarceration/Truth in Sentencing Act. IOWA LEGISLATIVE SERVS. AGENCY
FISCAL SERVS., REVIEW OF IOWA'S 85.0% SENTENCING LAW 1 (2003). Once that funding was
eliminated, Iowa no longer had a "financial incentive[] to maintain the 85.0% sentencing law." Id. at
3.
265. State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Iowa 1979).
266. Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and
the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1851 (1995). Mandatory minimum sentences
were seen by some as a means of addressing gender and race inequity in sentencing. Shimica
Gaskins, "Women of Circumstance "-The Effects of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing on Women
Minimally Involved in Drug Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1533, 1539 (2004); Oliss, supra, at
1852-53.
267. Myrna S. Raeder, The Forgotten Offender: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines and
Mandatory Minimums on Women and Their Children, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 157, 157 (1995). This
desire to enforce gender parity in sentencing is arguably a backlash against feminism. "As lawenforcement officials repeatedly told criminologist Rita Simon: 'If it's equality these women want,
we'll see that they get it."' JONES, supra note 94, at 4.
268. See generally Gaskins, supra note 266 (examining how mandatory minimum sentencing
affects women who were minimally involved in the commission of a drug crime).
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woman's involvement, factors mitigating her responsibility (for example,
physical abuse by the dealer coercing the woman's involvement), or the
woman's status as a mother or caregiver. 269
Battered women who kill face an analogous problem. Confronted
with mandatory minimum sentencing laws, battered women who choose
to take their chances at trial know that if convicted, judges will be unable
to factor the abuse that they have suffered-both over time and
immediately before the crime-into sentencing determinations.2 7 °
Judges are not able to consider the children and families left behind when
these mothers are incarcerated for long prison terms. They are not
permitted to factor in the previously spotless criminal records of the
offenders and the contributions those women made to their
communities. 271 And, as described above, much of this information is
important in determining the justice of a sentence under the prevailing
theories of punishment. Retributive goals are not met if the sentence
meted out gives an offender far more time than she deserves, given the
context in which she acted. Judges cannot weigh the good to society a
particular sentence would create if the judge has no options in
sentencing. Without some discretion, judges are unable to do justice.
3. Mandatory Minimums and State v. Shanahan
This is precisely what happened in State v. Shanahan. Dixie
Shanahan turned down a plea bargain that could have resulted in her
release in as little as four years.272 Instead, she chose to tell her story to
the jury; the jury rejected her self-defense claim, believing that her
269. Id. at 1541. In a recent Supreme Court oral argument, Justice Scalia suggested that women
who are coerced into crime have a choice-they could shoot their abusers rather than participate in
their crimes. Scalia joked, "I'd just wound him." Gina Holland, Justices Weigh Abuse in Woman's
Defense, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 25, 2006, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/
JusticesWeighAbuseinWomanDefense.pdf.
270. The ability to consider that information can make a tremendous difference. For example,
when Laura Rogers pled guilty to manslaughter after killing her husband, who had battered her and
videotaped his rape and impregnation of her daughter, Judge Paul A. Hackner factored expert
testimony about battered spouse syndrome into his decision to sentence her to ten years in prison but
to suspend all but the time she had served. Rogers was released from prison that day. Eric Rich,
Judge FreesKiller of 'Horrible'Husband,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2004, at B.
27 1. As the Honorable J. Spencer Letts explained, "Indeed, under this sledgehammer approach,
it could make no difference if the day before making this one slip in an otherwise unblemished life
the defendant had rescued 15 children from a burning building or had won the Congressional Medal
of Honor while defending his country." Gaskins, supra note 266, at 1543 (quoting FAMILIES
AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, MANDATORY SENTENCING WAS ONCE AMERICA'S LAW-ANDORDER PANACEA. HERE'S WHY IT'S NOT WORKING 5 (1998)).
272. Leonard Pitts Jr., Op-Ed., Sentencing Rules Ignore Common Sense, KAN. CITY STAR, June
8, 2004, at B7.
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husband had been asleep, and therefore not an imminent threat to her

when she shot him. 273 Because under Iowa law they could not be told the

penalties for the various crimes they were considering, some members of
the jury believed that the second-degree murder verdict would result in a
sentence of twenty-five years, and that Shanahan would be released in
eight.274 At least one juror believed the abuse Dixie Shanahan suffered
should have been factored into her sentence.2 75
But that choice was not available to Judge Smith. As he told Dixie
Shanahan at her sentencing, "[T]his Court has no option but to sentence
276
you to prison for the indeterminate term of not to exceed 50 years.,
Smith continued,
[I]t needs to be said that the mandatory minimum sentencing structure
that has been imposed on this court throughout the State of Iowa for
this type of offense is, in my opinion, wrong. It may be legal but it is
wrong. ....

...By imposing mandatory minimums as severe as this one in this
case, a legislature from 15 years ago is, in effect, sentencing you,
knowing nothing about this case, without trusting the good judgment of
the judge in the case and without trusting the good judgment of the
Board of Parole that might consider your case sooner than they will.

Perhaps, Dixie, your case will make the legislature, which is made
up of good people dedicated to public service, take notice and do
something to untie the hands of the judges in this state and the Parole
Board in this state. I hope so and I know your friends and you do as
well.
However, at this time, as your attorney has said, I have no other
options. ....

The reason for this sentence is the term of the statute-I'm sorry.277
Judge Smith knew that justice had not been done in this case. So did
many in the community that was ostensibly being kept safe by
273.
274.
MOINES

275.
276.
277.

Hupp, supra note 5.
Susan A. Benson-Blaine, Juror: I Wouldn't Change Verdict, But Sentence Extreme, DES
REG., May 25, 2004, at 7A.
Id.
Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 8, at 6.
Id. at 8-10.
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incarcerating Dixie Shanahan. One woman shared her story in a letter to
the editor of the Des Moines Register:
I am appalled she was convicted and sentenced so harshly. If you
have not been in her position, you cannot know the feeling of
helplessness that would drive you to protect yourself and your children
by such desperate means.
Twenty-four years ago I, too, held a gun to the head of my abuser as
he slept. The only reason I did 278
not pull that trigger is because my
infant daughter woke up and cried.
As Rekha Basu of the Des Moines Register concluded about the
Shanahan case, "There are cases where the law is followed to279
the letter,
but you'd be hard-pressed to conclude that justice was served.,
Shanahan's friends and attorney have asked Iowa governor Tom
Vilsack for a pardon. Three jurors signed a letter to the governor on her
behalf, stating, "'We would wholeheartedly support a decision on your
part to reduce Dixie Shanahan's sentence.' '280 In January 2007, Vilsack
responded to these entreaties by partially commuting her sentencedecreasing the time she was required to serve from thirty-five years to
ten before she is eligible for parole. 281 But the commutation fails to
address the underlying problem faced by Dixie Shanahan and other
battered women who kill. Dixie Shanahan did not receive a just sentence
because Judge Smith was unable to sentence her as an individual-as a
mother, as a member of the community, as a battered woman who had
endured nineteen years of horrific abuse. The Des Moines Register
opined, "In an ideal world, the judge would have established a sentence
based on a detailed assessment of the facts of Shanahan's case, her

278. Sherie Vermeer, Letter to the Editor, Have the Courage to Pardon Shanahan, DES MOINES
REG., June 8, 2004, at 8A; see also Letter to the Editor, Shanahan Punished by Husband and State,
DES MOINES REG., May 5, 2004, at 14A (publishing multiple letters to the editor arguing that
Shanahan's sentence was unfair).
279. Rekha Basu, Op-Ed., Dixie Shanahan Verdict: Where's the Justice?, DES MOINES REG.,
May 5, 2004, at 15A; see also Editorial, Tying Justice's Hands, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 12,
2004, at 6B ("Nothing can negate Shanahan's responsibility for her actions; we simply mean to point
out that justice in this case is not a simple mathematical formula. . . But in Iowa's judicial system,
there was no room for weighing those gray areas ofjustice. That's because of mandatory sentencing
laws."). But see Yepsen, supra note 231 (arguing against weakening mandatory minimum sentences
in wake of the Shanahan verdict).
280. Hupp, supra note 4.
281. Ferak, supra note 4. Iowa's Board of Parole previously denied her request for early release.
Bert Dalmer, ParoleBoard Says Dixie Duty Will Stay In Prison,DES MOINES REG, July 28, 2006,

http://www.desmoinesregister.con/apps/pbcs.dl/article
RSSOI

?
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record and potential for future criminal trouble based on expert
testimony." Instead, because of mandatory minimum sentencing, "The
sentence is the same, whether one is guilty of a pointless murder in the
commission of a crime or a tortured woman who withstood unspeakable
and did something
abuse from her husband before she finally snapped
282
she would never be in a position to do again."
4. The Case of Nancy Seaman
Nancy Seaman was a devout Catholic, a mother, a fourth-grade
teacher, and a victim of domestic violence. On May 10, 2004, Seaman
killed her husband, Robert, after he cut her with a knife and threatened
her life-the culmination of thirty years of abuse. Seaman grabbed an
axe and hacked her husband to death, then cleaned up the mess and kept
his body wrapped in a tarp in her car for three days. Seaman was found
guilty of first-degree murder. 283 At sentencing, Judge John J. McDonald
told Seaman that he "didn't doubt for a minute" that she had been abused
and urged her to share her story with other battered women so that they
would seek help before being faced with a situation like Seaman's, then
sentenced her.284 "'I have no choice but to sentence you to mandatory
life in prison . . . I wish you luck.' ' 285 What justification exists for
incarcerating women like Nancy Seaman and Dixie Shanahan for the rest
of their lives?
5. Mandatory Minimums Undermine the Justice of Punishment
Because the judges in the Shanahan and Seaman cases had no
discretion in sentencing, there was no justice for these women. Having
been found guilty of second-degree murder, Dixie Shanahan deserved
some sort of punishment. From a retributivist perspective, she should
have been given her just deserts. From a utilitarian perspective, she
should have received a punishment that created a greater good for
society. Dixie Shanahan's punishment did neither. The mandatory
minimum sentence meant that Judge Smith could not consider what just
deserts would mean for Dixie Shanahan, a battered woman who killed
her long-time abuser in order to save her unborn child. Instead, Dixie
Shanahan received the same deserts as every other offender convicted of
282.

Editorial, Bring Sense to Sentencing, DES MOINES REG., May 4, 2004, at 10A.

283.

Mike Martindale, Jury Doesn'tBuy Seaman's Story, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 15, 2004, at IA.

284.

Mike Martindale, Seaman Gets Life in Prison, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 25, 2005, at I B.
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second-degree murder-those with no prior histories with their victims,
those with lengthy criminal records, those who did not have any reason
to believe that their lives were in danger. For deserts to be just, they
must be individualized; retributivists believe that no two punishments
should be the same. Mandatory sentencing precludes judges from
engaging in that type of analysis.
Mandatory sentences also prevent judges from weighing the costs
and benefits of incarcerating a particular individual. Judge Smith could
not consider whether some other punishment-for example, requiring
that Dixie Shanahan work on behalf of other battered victims and share
her story with victims and abusers-would be more likely than
incarceration to deter other battered women from killing their spouses.
He could not determine whether incapacitating Dixie Shanahan would
inure to the benefit of society by preventing future crime. He could not
weigh the costs of incarcerating Dixie Shanahan-financial, social, and
personal-against the benefits to society of some other sentence.
The justice of punishment is intimately tied to understanding the
individual offender and examining the context for that offender's actions.
Without discretion to consider anything other than the crime itself,
judges cannot develop punishments that are just from either a
retributivist or a utilitarian perspective.
Mandatory minimums
undermine the justifications for criminal punishment and result in unjust
punishments-as they did in the case of Dixie Shanahan.
The judges in the Shanahan and Seaman cases recognized the
fundamental injustice of sentencing these women to long prison terms,
but were shackled by state mandatory minimum sentencing
requirements.
But in many other jurisdictions, there are no such
requirements. What explains the imposition of unjust sentences in cases
involving battered women who kill in these states?
B. JudicialUnwillingness to Consider Context
Judicial discretion is a necessary, but not sufficient, element in
establishing just punishments. If judges have the discretion to consider
the context in which battered women kill, but refuse to do so, that refusal
undermines the justice of punishment just as effectively as being fettered
by mandatory minimum laws.
Judges can foreclose the introduction of context into sentencing in
two ways. They can block the introduction of evidence on domestic
violence in the cases of battered women who kill. In the alternative, they
can admit such evidence but dismiss it because they do not believe that
the battered woman's claims are credible or relevant to sentencing.
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Since courts and legislatures paved the way for the introduction of
evidence on battered women's syndrome in the cases of battered women
who killed their abusers, pretrial battles about whether defendants can
present expert testimony on the applicability of the syndrome to their
own situations have become common. Prosecutors routinely argue that
the defendant does not fit the stereotype of the battered woman described
by the syndrome; defense attorneys argue that the syndrome does not
describe a prototypical victim, but rather a set of behaviors and reactions
that are common to women who have been abused.2 86 The verdict in the
case of a battered woman who kills is profoundly affected by her ability
to bring such evidence before the court; that evidence provides the
context necessary to understand the woman's perceptions, experiences,
and choices.
The decision to exclude such evidence can have a substantial impact
on the justice of punishment as well. Kathy Thomas shot her boyfriend,
Reuben Daniels, after Reuben began to severely beat her (not for the first
time) while she made dinner. 287 Reuben pushed Kathy from the kitchen
onto the living room couch, where she found his gun, picked it up and
shot him. 288 At trial, the judge refused to allow two experts to testify
about battered woman syndrome. 289 Kathy Thomas was convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to fifteen years to life.29 °
Would hearing evidence about how enduring four years of repeated
severe beatings affected Kathy Thomas's perception of the danger she
faced have changed the outcome of her case? That question cannot be
answered definitively, but it is fair to say that hearing such evidence
might have convinced the judge that a lighter sentence was appropriate.
Barring evidence about past abuse and the effects of that abuse prevents
the judge from understanding why the battered woman acted as she did,
and therefore crafting a sentence tailored to her individual crime. When

286. Of course, charging decisions are crucial as well.
As one commentator noted,
"[P]rosecutors are likely to bring charges even when they believe the equities favor a reduced
sentence. Suffolk County, New York, district attorney James M. Catterson, Jr., stated, 'When you
have a life taken, there has to be some punishment. But it may be punishment with sensitivity and
understanding."' Alison M. Madden, Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers:
Finding a Just Forum, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 35 (1993). The problem, of course, is that
judges sometimes cannot or will not punish with sensitivity or understanding, as discussed in Part
V.B.
287. Linda L. Ammons, DiscretionaryJustice:A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor's Use
of the Clemency Power in the Cases of IncarceratedBattered Women, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (1994).
288. Id.
289. Id.

290. Id.
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sentences are divorced from the experiences of the individual offender,
the justice of punishment is undermined.
Given changes in the law, as well as a growing awareness of the
value of testimony on battered women's experiences of violence, judges
are less likely than in the past to prevent such evidence from coming in
altogether. Equally damaging to the battered woman's attempt to obtain
a just sentence, however, is a judge's unwillingness to factor the abuse
she has suffered into her sentence. Consider, for example, the case of
Kosal Pang, who pled guilty to third-degree murder in the death of her
291 Pang and her
husband.
three children all described the abuse they
endured at the hands of Sokhan Sao. Their children testified that Sao
kicked, hit, and dragged Pang by the hair.292 On one occasion, Sao threw
boiling soup in Pang's face, injuring her eye. 293 Sao pistol-whipped his
son for being late to school.294 Pang, a Cambodian refugee, distrusted
the government and would not ask police for help.295 Despite this
evidence, Judge Bernard Moore sentenced Pang to ten to twenty years of
imprisonment, calling her behavior "outrageous" and stating, "[t]he
message to society must be that we protect the sanctity of life. , 296 Moore
may also have been swayed by the prosecutor's argument that Ms.
Pang's claims of abuse were not credible because she did not "fit the
typical profile of a battered woman whose life is often controlled by her
abuser," since she worked outside of the home, drove a car, and had a
boyfriend.297
In contrast, Nancy Gulich had gone to battered women's shelters and
sought medical care for the injuries inflicted upon her by her husband,

291. Pamela Lehman, Wife Gets State Prison in Killing, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), June
9, 2005, at B 1.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. As Amy Busch notes, the perception of battered women as helpless is particularly
problematic for battered women who kill, because they defy notions of who battered women are
supposed to be by killing their abusers. BUSCH, supra note 95, at 40. Juries who impose sentences
dismiss claims of abuse not just in finding guilt, but also in sentencing. Olga Hemandez, whose
children testified that she was beaten at least once a week for eighteen years, was sentenced by a jury
to sixty years of imprisonment for the murder of her husband. John MacCormack, Wife Gets 60Year Term for Killing Her Spouse, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEWS, Jan. 18, 2005, at 2B. Hernandez
acknowledged that she shot her husband and that she should be punished, but asked to stay out of
prison so that she could be with her children. Id.When asked by the prosecutor, "'[i]f you are the
victim, then what do you call him, Ms. Hernandez?,"' she replied, "'[a] victim, too.,' Jesse Bogan,
Widow Tells Jury of SpousalAbuse, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 15, 2005, at 3B.
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Paul Gulich, 298 before she stabbed him in self-defense when he flew into
a rage. 299 Nancy was found guilty of third-degree murder and sentenced
to ten to twenty years in prison-less than the maximum sentence of
twenty to forty years, but a substantial jail term nonetheless for a fortytwo-year-old woman with no prior history of violence. 30 0 During
sentencing, the judge announced that while he had considered mitigating
evidence-presumably, the violence she endured over time and the
circumstances surrounding Paul Gulich's death-he "determined that
punishment was necessary. ' 0°
Battered women who kill "emphasize the circumstances of their
actions, urging the criminal justice system to look at the violence they
endured, at their inability to separate from their batterers, and at the lack
of resources or solutions offered to them"-the context in which their
crimes take place.30 2 Justice requires not only that judges hear evidence
about this violence when sentencing battered women who kill, but that
they also use that evidence to determine what a just desert would be.
Like Dixie Shanahan, these women did not receive their just desertsnot because of judges whose discretion was fettered, but because of
judges whose discretion went unused.
C. The Myth of the Killing Spree
Recall the words of the Des Moines Register columnist who urged
that Dixie Shanahan serve a lengthy sentence: "Open a loophole for one
woman to kill an abusive spouse and pretty soon you've got dozens of
dead husbands. 30 3 Is there truth to this statement? Or does it reflect the
unfounded fear that abused women everywhere will rise up to slay their
abusive partners if given the chance?
In a number of cases, abused women who have killed their partners
have been acquitted. 304 The media have not reported an uptick in the
298. See Debbie Garlicki, Woman Gets 10-20 Years in '04 Killing, MORNING CALL (Allentown,
Pa.), Feb. 2, 2006, at B I (describing how Nancy's visits to shelters were well documented).
299. The jury "rejected Nancy Gulich's claim that she acted in self-defense." Id.
300. See id. (describing Nancy as a nonviolent person).
301. Id.
302. BUSCH, supra note 95, at 67.
303. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. Prosecutor Ron Johnson believed that this
permission to kill would extend beyond just abusive partners. As he argued in State v. Hawthorne:
"'You'll open the door to allow any woman to kill a man she doesn't like, and get away with it! ...
It will be open season on killing men... !' WALKER, supra note 93, at 33; see also JONES, supra
note 94, at 324 (quoting juror who feared that acquittal of battered woman who killed would lead to
"open season on husbands in Atkinson County").
304. See, e.g., Alayna DeMartini, Woman Testifies in Civil Trial over Fatal Shooting of
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number of murders of abusive partners in those communities. Just as
battered women are unlikely to be deterred from killing their abusive
partners by the punishment that other women who kill receive, they are
equally unlikely to kill their partners because other women are
acquitted-or receive less than the maximum sentence. Battered women
kill in very specific circumstances and for very specific reasons. They
kill when their individual assessments of their own situations make them
believe that they have no other choice but to kill or be killed.30 5 Luckily,
relatively few battered women find themselves in situations that
desperate. Compared to the number of women in the United States who
each year, the number of battered women who kill is very
are battered
30 6
small.
Look at trends in the homicide rates among intimate partners. Over
the past thirty years, the number of women being killed by intimate
partners has fallen by about 1% per year.30 7 Over that same period of
time, however, the number of men being killed by their partners has
declined by about 4% annually.30 8 Of the 1830 murders attributable to
intimate partners in 1998, women made up nearly 75% of the victims, an
increase from just over 50% of all victims of intimate partner murder in
1976.309 The decline in the number of men being killed by their abused
partners may be attributable to the greater availability of services and
support for battered women. 310 Improved services provide most battered
Husband, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 2004, at B 14 (describing the circumstances surrounding
the acquittal of Kimberly Anderson); Eric Lenkowitz, LiberatedWoman, N.Y. POST, Apr. 20, 2004,
at 23 (describing the case against and acquittal of Vanessa McCray); James L. Rosica, Jury: Actions
Were Self-Defense, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, June 3, 2005, at B I (describing the acquittal of
Anderia Belvis). Ann Jones argues that the media, by publicizing acquittals but failing to report on
the more numerous cases where battered women were convicted of murdering their husbands, fed
fears that men were being killed with impunity. JONES, supra note 94, at 291, 292. "Acquitted
women.., were news precisely because they were the exception and not the rule; but reporting only
acquittals left the reading public with the mistaken notion that women were 'getting off with
increasing frequency and were rarely if ever convicted of murder." Id. at 292. In fact, battered
women are convicted of homicide at about the same rates as other defendants in homicide and
serious felony trials-seventy-five to eighty percent. Maguigan, supra note 110, at 400 n.77.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95 (describing what drives women to kill their
intimate partners).
306. In their analysis of the National Violence Against Women Survey, Patricia Tjaden and
Nancy Thoennes estimated that 1.3 million women annually were assaulted by their partners.
OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 10 (2000). In contrast, 512 men were killed by
their intimate partners in 1998. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 10 tbl.2 (2000).
307. RENNISON & WELCHANS, supra note 306, at 1.

308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See supra note 234 (discussing the positive effects of the increase in resources).

2007]

THE PUNISHMENT OF DIXIE SHANAHAN

women with options other than killing a partner to escape an abusive
relationship. The notion that battered women are simply waiting for a
sign, in the form of reduced punishment, that it is socially acceptable to
kill their abusers is ridiculous. But it is also possible that this widely
held notion prevents judges from imposing just sentences on battered
women who kill.
V1. CONCLUSION

Some justification is required before punishing women like Dixie
Shanahan-women who have been brutalized in uncountable ways and
who perceive that they have no other alternative-for killing their
abusers.
Of the theories employed by legal philosophers, only
retributivism, with its focus on individualized punishment that fits the
crime committed and the offender who commits that crime, provides
sufficient justification for punishing these women. But just deserts have
been denied to Dixie Shanahan, Nancy Seaman, Kosal Pang, Nancy
Gulich, and countless other battered women forced to make the terrible
choice between their own lives and those of their abusers. Mandatory
minimum sentences, judicial unwillingness to factor abuse in to
punishment, and fears of widespread retaliation against abusive partners
all contribute to the failure to sentence these women in ways
commensurate with their crimes. And because they have not or cannot
receive their just deserts, there is no justice for battered women who kill.

